| It is the argument of this thesis that both the formal structure of rights as a system of rules and the particular scope and content of the rights comprising that formal structure can only be justified by reference to a theory or theories of justice. Ultimately, therefore, the justification of any particular theory, conception or system of rights depends on the justification of the underlying theory of justice. Because only some theories of justice can provide a justification for rights, such justification requires a defence of at least one of these theories of justice against rival conceptions of justice which are incapable of providing any such justification of rights.;In Chapter One a preliminary conceptual analysis of the formal structure of rights is presented and the viability of so-called "rights-based" moral theories is questioned. It is argued that these theories themselves implicitly rely on notions of justice. Thus, notions of justice, not rights, provide the true foundation for a rights-based approach.;In Chapter Two the attempt by Alan Gewirth to derive a theory of rights from an analysis of rational agency is examined. It is argued that Gewirth's approach is unsuccessful.;In Chapter Three attempts to provide utilitarian or consequentialist justifications for rights are examined and also found unsuccessful.;In the fourth and concluding chapter the problem of justifying a theory of justice against its rivals is reviewed. It is argued that the rights which should be considered fundamental are those which render rational argument about justice possible. |
