Rational choice theory in United States economic, political, and policy science, 1944--1985: Social scientists transform the language of democracy

Rational choice theory assumes that human beings are self-interested, strategic actors, and asks "How can a society of selfish citizens produce collective welfare without authoritarian government?" This dissertation seeks to understand the origins, development and significance of rational choice theory in American economic, political, and policy science from 1944 to 1985. Most often, this story is told as one of "economics imperialism," suggesting that rational actor formalism was articulated by Adam Smith, developed by the marginalist economists, and subsequently adopted by other social sciences, especially political science. I propose instead that rational choice theory represents a clear rupture with earlier economic thought; and that it originated in game theory and the strategic imperatives of the Cold War national security state. From the outset, rational choice theory and rational policy analysis were linked by a common set of researchers, institutions, funding patterns, and core ideas. My analysis of the writings and careers of Kenneth J. Arrow, James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and William H. Riker shows how rational choice theory emerged as an interlocking set of parallel intellectual movements, each reformulating the normative foundations of democracy. I argue that rational choice theory crosses the normative/descriptive divide, and that it represents a new language of political theory and practice. Rational choice theory has consistencies with a model of social science inquiry pioneered by Smith, but these consistencies are of a different nature than suggested by the simplistic economics imperialism thesis. I argue that like Smith's Wealth of Nations, rational choice scholarship uses social science methodology to draw prescriptive conclusions. Rational choice theory, as a new means of understanding the social coordination of individual action, must be acknowledged as an important contribution to the political philosophy of liberalism.;This dissertation explores the antecedents of the rational actor in Smith's political economy and marginalist economics. It investigates the origins of rational choice theory in Cold War technocracy as manifested in the RAND Corporation, McNamara's Pentagon, and Johnson's Great Society Program. It also focuses on three specific rational choice movements, Arrow's social choice, Buchanan and Tullock's public choice, and Riker's positive political theory.