Quine, Wittgenstein, and 'our knowledge of the world'

W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein both intend their views on knowledge and justification to be genuine departures from traditional epistemology. Quine aims to naturalize epistemology by placing it, as he often says, in the same boat as science. I argue, however, that Quine's naturalizing moves are in tension with his tacit commitment to the project of traditional epistemology. By appeal to Michael Williams's insights concerning the inextricability of traditional epistemology and radical scepticism, and their shared presupposition of foundationalism, I argue that Quine, in the end, builds scepticism into his epistemological enterprise in such a way as to "sink" his boat of scientific knowledge.; Wittgenstein deflates the fundamental assumption that underwrites traditional epistemology and scepticism, in virtue of highlighting the contextual character of knowledge and justification. I draw on Williams's argument to the effect that adopting contextualism is the only way to be consistent in repudiating traditional epistemology and scepticism; and I argue that (despite some superficial similarities between Wittgenstein's and Quine's epistemic views) Wittgenstein's view is indeed distinct from that of Quine and the traditional epistemologist. Moreover, I appeal to Williams's theoretical diagnosis of scepticism in order to suggest that Wittgenstein's contextualism is enough to inoculate us against the threat of radical scepticism.