| Voluntary approaches to environmental protection are sometimes called the next generation of environmental policies. Despite the recent proliferation of voluntary pollution reduction initiatives, policy makers and practitioners know little about the factors that affect participation in these initiatives, nor do they know much about the effectiveness of these initiatives in achieving their stated objectives. This dissertation investigates these issues in three different contexts.; In Essay 1, I explore firm motivations to develop environmental management systems (EMSs). Through an econometric analysis, I test the hypothesis that stakeholder pressures, regulatory pressures, ability, parent company's influence, and market conditions are the factors that motivate Japanese manufacturers to develop EMSs. I find that consumer pressures and market power are two major motivating factors. I also find that technical knowledge and market structure become insignificant after controlling for self-selection, both of which were found significant in the previous studies.; In Essay 2, I conduct the first empirical analysis of investor reactions to a PRTR outside of the United States. Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) are hypothesized to provide environmental information to investors who are expected to apply pressure to firms to reduce emissions. Previous analyses of the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory observed negative abnormal returns to the stocks of firms listed on the Inventory. In contrast, I find no evidence of negative investor reactions to firms listed on Japan's PRTR. I explore several institutional reasons for these contradictory results. These reasons point to obstacles for empirical analyses of the increasing number of PRTRs being implemented globally.; In Essay 3, I theoretically investigate economic consequences of information disclosure policies. I first illustrate that alleviating asymmetric information through eco-labeling may worsen environmental quality. I then show that this is not specific to eco-labeling. Since aggregate pollution may become larger under perfect information compared to under asymmetric information, information disclosure policies in general could potentially affect the environment negatively. I finally show that in contrast to information disclosure policies, raising minimum quality standards unambiguously reduce aggregate pollution. Policy implications of these results are discussed. |
