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On the security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol

Posted on:2005-09-20Degree:M.ScType:Thesis
University:University of Calgary (Canada)Candidate:Cannings, RichardFull Text:PDF
GTID:2458390008997380Subject:Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:
The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol enables two authenticated parties to generate a secret key over an insecure quantum channel. Using a standardized security definition, we prove that BB84 is secure and include explicit bounds on its security. Furthermore, our use of quantum circuit diagrams simplify the Shor-Preskill proof. Namely, we can reduce the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to a practical version of BB84 using the observation from Shor and Preskill that one may ignore a correctable number of phase errors, and the fact that computational basis measurements commute with controls of CNOT operations.;The first four chapters provide the required background material on quantum computing, information theory, cryptography, coding theory, and quantum error correcting codes. Chapter 5 presents protocols for entanglement purification. Chapter 6 reduces an entanglement purification protocol to the Modified Lo-Chau QKD, and proves that it is secure. Finally, a reduction from the Modified Lo-Chau QKD to BB84 establishes the security of the latter.
Keywords/Search Tags:BB84, Modified lo-chau QKD, Quantum, Security, Key
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