The life of the concept Freedom and Form in Hegel's Logic

This dissertation explores the relation between reason and nature in Hegel's philosophy, arguing that the concept of life is at the center of Hegel's understanding of freedom and conceptual form. Against the dominant "metaphysical" and "non-metaphysical" readings, I suggest that Hegel's theory of concepts provides a systematic argument for the double constitution of self-conscious rational life---that freedom must always be understood as an expression of both reason and nature, without erasing their difference. I argue that it is in Hegel's Logic in particular that a theory of freedom and form based on the logical form of life is developed.;This thesis is presented in two parts. In part one, I explore the concept of purposiveness in both Kant's and Hegel's philosophies, arguing that knowledge of the form of living things is a condition for self-consciousness and knowledge. To that end, I offer a reading of Kant's first and third Critiques, as well as Hegel's Jena writings. In part two, I offer a reconstructive reading of Hegel's Logic, with a focus on the Subjective Logic. Here, I argue that Hegel presents the very form of reason and self-determination as an actualization of the logical form of life. I conclude by suggesting that Hegel's famous account of absolute method must be understood as an ongoing dialectic between life and cognition.