Hume's account of causation and its applications (David Hume)

David Hume's account of causation is central to the presentation and development of A Treatise of Human Nature. In this dissertation, I examine three instances of his innovative causal treatments of philosophical problems or issues, which reveal the pervasiveness of his account of causation in his overall philosophy. In these instances, although Hume's explanations are causal, they are nevertheless philosophically interesting.; The three topics I examine are: mind-body interaction; belief in the external world; and liberty and necessity. These have been selected to illustrate the extent and the variety of ways that causation factors into his philosophy. Sometimes Hume explicitly seeks a causal explanation: e.g., he asks what the causes are of our belief in the external world. Sometimes the debate that he considers is itself a causal matter: e.g., the debate over whether our choices are caused by antecedent motives. Sometimes he uses general causal considerations, without drawing on features unique to his own account, to reject a thesis: e.g., the philosophical objection to the native belief that our impressions have continued and distinct existence. At other times, he appeals specifically to his own account of causation: e.g., his solution to the mind-body interaction problem.; The dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part, I examine Hume's epistemological principles and the development of his account of causation. His solution to the mind-body interaction problem is discussed in connection with his rejection of the Cartesian conception of causation. In the second part, I examine two applications of his account of causation: the debate over liberty and necessity; and belief in the external world. I have included two appendixes where I address peripheral issues relating to his treatment of sense perception. In the first appendix, I interpret the corresponding discussion of sense perception in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding; in the second appendix, I examine Hume's rejection of the primary-secondary qualities distinction.