The role of third party incentives in hurting stalemate: A critique of ripeness theory

This study examines and compares two prominent models related to the timing and conduct of negotiations to resolve protracted conflicts: the mutually hurting stalemate and the enticing opportunity models. Two theories that specifically spotlight the timing of the initiation and resolution of hard-to-resolve conflicts, ripeness theory and readiness theory, are reviewed in detail. Using simulated negotiations, the study then examines the effects of offering third-party positive incentives to conflicting parties in a civil war situation.;Two dichotomies are employed in this study: low hurt/high hurt and weak incentives/substantial incentives. I hypothesized that generally incentives would positively influence a conflict party to negotiate and settle in a high hurt situation. Based on this proposition and Zartman's (2000) revised ripeness theory, two further hypotheses were developed and tested. The first proposed that under weak incentives high hurt groups would be more reluctant to negotiate and conceded than low hurt groups, because of resistant reactions. The proposition for the second hypothesis is that substantial incentives would counteract resistant reactions and encourage high hurt groups more than low hurt groups.;A two by two factorial design involving two levels of hurt (high and low) and two levels of third-party incentives (weak and substantial) was developed to test the hypotheses. The simulate negotiation study involved sixty-six African students from American and African universities. Two independent variables were manipulated---level of hurt and strength of third part incentives---and four main dependent variables were measured by means of questionnaires---willingness to negotiate, willingness to conceded, willingness to reach agreement, and perceived concession making during the negotiation.;Resistant reactions did not occur under weak incentives hence, hurt was not a factor in encouraging parties to negotiate and make concessions. But non-significant trends showed a nearly-significant finding that high hurt groups believed that both parties had conceded more than low hurt groups.;For hypothesis two, it was found that high hurt groups were significantly more willing to negotiate than low hurt groups. This supports Zartman's (1989) original ripeness theory, which postulates that a hurting stalemate will produce greater willingness to negotiate, hurt was a factor in participants' willingness to negotiate and that high hurt group were more willing than low hurt groups, suggesting that resistant reaction may have occurred. This hurt effect was somewhat larger when substantial as opposed to weak incentives were offered. This effect did not reach significance, but was in the direction of hypothesis two, suggesting that the high incentives may have dispelled resistant reactions in some participants. However, parties were not willing to agree to make concessions ahead of negotiation, perhaps because they were experiencing resistant reactions. There was also a non-significant trend towards more willingness to concede under high as opposed to low hurt, again providing some support for Zartman's (1989) original ripeness theory.;There was a statistical significance for perceived concessions made and received during the negotiation; suggesting that hurt may have been a factor in actual concession making. Participants believed that they made and received greater concessions under high hurt than under low hurt when they were offered weak incentives. This supports Pruitt's (200030 extension of Zartman's original ripeness theory to concession making during negotiation. There were not statistically significant findings for willingness to reach agreement, but non-statistical findings showed that participants were more willing to reach agreement when offered substantial incentives under high hurt than under low hurt. This also is in the direction of hypothesis two.