| My dissertation examines the analytical lenses states employ to predict the behavior of current or prospective adversaries. I address two questions: How do policy makers -- specifically, civilian decision-makers and intelligence communities -- infer the political and military intentions of an adversary? And, to what extent do such perceptions affect a state's foreign policies and strategic choices? Using extensive archival research, newly-declassified documents, and interviews with former decision-makers and intelligence analysts, I evaluate three competing theoretical perspectives on the links between intentions and changes in perceptions, which I term the "capabilities thesis," the "strategic-military doctrine thesis," and the "behavioral-signals thesis.";For each of these three theories, I elaborate upon logical causal mechanisms and thereby derive more nuanced hypotheses. I then subject those hypotheses to empirical test through carefully selected case studies of Britain's assessment of Nazi Germany's intentions prior to WWII, U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions during the years leading to the collapse of detente, and U.S. assessments during the final years of the Cold War. To test the empirical validity of the three theses, in each case I employ within-case congruence tests as well as careful process tracing. Specifically, I provide an in-depth analysis of the evolution in perceived intentions, the reasoning decision-makers and intelligence analysts invoked to support their assessments, and the policies decision-makers advocated.;The evidence I examine reveals that intelligence communities and civilian decision-makers use quite different analytic lenses to assess intentions -- a finding which underscores the limited usefulness of relying on unitary actor assumptions when analyzing a state's perceived intentions of its adversary. Specifically, in all three cases civilian decision makers revised their beliefs about the adversary intentions quite substantially in response to changes in the adversary's domestic and international behavior. By contrast, the intelligence community revised expectations to a substantially lesser degree, and focused on the adversary's material capabilities rather than behavior. Further, intelligence community estimates of intentions have either been irrelevant to, or lagged behind, the perceptions of key civilian decision-makers. |
