| This thesis analyzes the contributions of the European militarily nonaligned states--Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland--to nuclear nonproliferation discussions with actual or suspected proliferators. I isolate two hypotheses. First, the relatively close relationships that these states often have with proliferators enable them to play key roles in nonproliferation discussions. Second, it is possible to identify certain types of roles and policy activities that have facilitated these states' contributions to nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy. I test these hypotheses by examining case studies of Swedish and Swiss efforts to enhance dialogue between Iran, North Korea, and their U.S. and European Union interlocutors. My analysis supported the first hypothesis. Economic and diplomatic ties with proliferants, and the ability to pursue autonomous foreign policy agendas, have enabled Sweden and Switzerland to act as intermediaries in nonproliferation talks. The data also supported the second hypothesis. Militarily nonaligned states have contributed to nonproliferation efforts by passing messages, holding consultations with negotiating parties, developing compromise proposals, hosting direct talks and track II diplomatic engagements, and influencing the policies of international organizations. Based upon strong support for each hypothesis and the generalizability of my analytic conclusions, this thesis underscores the need for greater inclusion of European militarily nonaligned states in nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Successful employment of these states' intermediary diplomatic capabilities will require both open-mindedness from negotiating parties and more assertiveness from militarily nonaligned states. |
