A compelling case for deterrence: Deterrence theory and nuclear proliferation

This thesis challenges the perception of deterrence theory as a Cold War relic. To determine its current relevance, deterrence theory and its effectiveness at reducing nuclear proliferation among rogue states is examined. Deterrence theory suggests that as long as four necessary preconditions are met, communication, commitment, capability and resolve, deterrence will succeed. However, if one of those conditions is absent deterrence will fail. The accuracy of that theory will be tested by examining the cases of North Korea, Iran and Libya. By examining which conditions are or are not present in each of the given cases and exchanges the validity of the theory can be determined. Ultimately, it is concluded that when the four conditions are all present, deterrence is effective, however when any one condition is absent, deterrence fails. As a result, deterrence theory is found to be valid and relevant and should be considered in future non-proliferation strategies.