| This work addresses the debate over the potential viability of nuclear deterrence between the newly-nuclear states in the developing world. Currently, the scholarly community is split into two opposed and mutually exclusive groups. One group believes in the efficacy of deterrence and thus tends to favor proliferation, while another grouping of research efforts questions the viability of deterrence in both the First and Third World.; This dissertation is an attempt to synthesize and formalize the key questions of this debate through (1) a literature review and explicit framing of what are often only implicit hypotheses in the pro-deterrence school; (2) a historical analysis of the causes of proliferation in the developing world, with a focus on those conflict characteristics that describe the position of international “outcasts” across problem regions (the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia); (3) a look at the consequences of nuclear proliferation through a historical critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence; and (4) a game-theoretic model that incorporates structural characteristics which address the specific circumstances of regional rivals.; The results show severe weaknesses in the pro-proliferation school. Historically, the presence of competing ideological perceptions in rivalries has led to fears of nuclear blackmail, attempts to achieve escalation dominance in force deployments, and anxieties about conventional and nuclear force imbalances that could undermine stability. Deductively, in the confines of the game model, nuclear blackmail is still possible if threat crediblity at the nuclear level favors one side or if conventional force imbalances exist. Nuclear weapons generally fail to bridge the gap left by incapable conventional forces, and stability is always tied to particular variations of threat credibility and capability, rather than resting solely on the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by both rivals. Deterrence between developing countries is neither simple nor preordained. Although nuclear weapons might in some cases bestow status-quo stability between rivals that are under the constant threat of major attacks, they should be viewed as temporary military expedients at best, rather than long-term policy solutions. |
