| This thesis is a study of the most well-known Neo-Russellian replies to the problems raised by genuinely empty names for Neo-Russellianism. In particular, three different Neo-Russellian views are considered and critically evaluated. I argue that Neo-Russellianism is deeply problematic with regard to the problems raised by genuinely empty names. The conclusion is that either Millianism or the thesis of singular Russellian propositions is false.;I argue that none of these views provides a successful defense of Neo-Russellianism. From this we can conclude that Neo-Russellianism, in its current versions, is not acceptable. Nevertheless, as I argue in the fourth chapter, one may want to reject the existence of empty names in natural language and therefore erase the problems raised by empty names for Neo-Russellianism altogether. I provide three arguments that it cannot be the case; there are always genuinely empty names in natural language. As a hypothetical defense of Neo-Russellianism, one may suggest a radically modified version of Neo-Russellianism: Semi-Meinongian Neo-Russellianism. According to this view, all names of natural language refer. Quite besides the arguments for the inevitability of genuinely empty names in natural language and problems with Meinongian ontologies, I show that even Semi-Meinongian Neo-Russellianism does not answer important problems raised by empty names for Neo-Russellianism. At least with regard to such problems, Neo-Russellianism is deeply problematic. Furthermore, since the formulation of these problems only requires atomic simple sentences containing genuinely empty names, these problems threaten the heart of Neo-Russellianism: Millianism and the thesis of singular Russellian propositions. I conclude that at least one of these theses should be rejected.;The first Neo-Russellian view, developed by David Braun (1993; 2005) and at least partially shared by Jennifer Saul (2007), is introduced and criticized in the first chapter. The second, defended by Nathan Salmon (1987; 1998) and Scott Soames (2002; 2005), is explained and evaluated in the second chapter. And the third, defended by many including Fred Adams et al. (Garry Fuller, Robert Stecker, and Laura Dietrich) (1994; 1997; 2004; 2007) and, in a slightly different form, Kenneth Taylor (2000) is presented and assessed in the third chapter. |
