| In this paper I demonstrate one way that Bayesian confirmation theory can contribute to an epistemology of several key metaphysical concepts found at the core of the natural sciences. I then use the results to generalize the Paradox of Confirmation in a way that, I contend, undermines the standard Bayesian solution to the Paradox as well as the more recent refinements proposed in (Howson & Urbach, 2006), (Fitelson, 2006), (Fitelson & Hawthorne, Forth.), and (Vranas, 2004). The formal results presented serve as yet another illustration of the inadequacy of the standard Bayesian solutions to the Paradox of Confirmation, prompting Bayesians of all stripes to reject the standard solution. As an upshot, this thesis also demonstrates that it is imprudent to ignore metaphysical phenomena when constructing a theory of confirmation. |
