Comparison Of The Remedy Effect Of VER And Tariffs

The China-US trade war that has lasted nearly two years has brought protectionism back to life.Tariffs,as a means of immense trade protection,are the most popular trade remedy measure in various countries.VERs have always been in the "grey area" as a means of relief.Although they are not allowed by WTO law,they cannot actually be completely banned.The purpose of this article is to compare the effect of tariffs and voluntary export restrictions on the country's export trade remedy.Under the WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism and the rules of safeguard measures,the trade effects of general safeguard measures and special safeguard measures are discussed,and it is found that general safeguard measures and special safeguard measures have trade-damaging effects.Then,a four-stage dynamic game model of voluntary export restriction measures under special safeguard measures and export tariff measures under general safeguard measures is established,and the negotiation interval between the two parties under general safeguard measures and special safeguard measures is solved by the inverse solution method.And obtained several conditions for the two parties to adopt the optimal strategy under various game stages under voluntary export restriction measures and import tariff measures.The research in this paper finds that it is more advantageous for the parties in trade friction to reach a voluntary export restriction agreement than to adopt a tariff,that is,the relief effect of VERs is better than that of tariff.And the cost conditions negotiated by the two parties under general safeguard measures are higher than those negotiated under special safeguard measures.Regardless of the cost of negotiation,the negotiation interval negotiated between the two parties under general safeguard measures is larger than the negotiation interval between the two parties under special safeguard measures.