Research On The Impact Of Ultimate Control Rights In Asset Evaluation For Listed Companie

During the period from 2018 to 2019,many listed companies have not fulfilled their performance commitments and used large-scale impairment of business reputation.Public directional issuance was more often used by many companies as a tool to get money for the pubic,how to evaluate the assets properly without harming the interests of major shareholders has become a hot topic and draw much concern among many researchers.Due to the imbalance in rights and information transparency between major and small shareholders within the company,directional issuance may have huge influence for the company's equity structure,control rights,asset quality and future revenue performance.Moreover,it can also accelerate the process of benefits transmission to the ultimate controller.In this process,the fairness of asset evaluation plays the key role to avoid unreasonable value delivering or benefit transmission cases.Monitoring the value-added rate is an important criteria for assessing whether the transfer of interests is reasonable.In fact,the information in the evaluation market is non-transparent,the evaluation results can only be used as a reference.The ultimate controller has capable ability and motivation to manipulate asset evaluations result.In order to restrict the irrational behaviour of the ultimate controller and its related parties,the performance commitment compensation mechanism has emerged as the solution.Different performance commitment have different impacts on evaluating issuance bids,and also have different capabilities of restraining the ultimate controller's benefits transmission behavior.This dissertation focus on how the characteristics of ultimate control will influence the assets evaluation for issuance bids,and explores the relationship between ultimate control rights and performance compensation commitments.Firstly,the dissertation gives the definition of some concepts that are relevant with the them topic.Secondly,the literature review part covers the theoretical background information and recent research progress both in China and abroad.By adopting the "dual control chain" research method,the thesis studies the possibledeprivation of the ultimate controller and clarifies the dynamic mechanism on high premium.This dissertation selects the listed companies which made performance compensation commitments to the ultimate controller and implemented directional issuance in China's Shanghai or Shenzhen market during the year 2008 to 2018 as the researching sample.The characteristics of ultimate control rights,performance compensation commitments,and fixed asset evaluations are all put into a framework for doing the research.The final experiment result shows that the degree on two-right ultimate controller separation,the complexity of the control network structure,and fixed assets positively correlate to the appraisal rate of appreciation;the higher the ultimate controller's control on the board of directors and managers,the higher the rate of appraisal of the assets to be increased.Compared with cash payment compensation and one-way performance commitments,share payment compensation and two-way performance commitments can weaken the ultimate controller's use of control rights to manipulate the target asset assessment of the hollowing out behavior.Finally,on the basis of the relevant results,the article puts forward specific recommendations that it is expected to effectively restrict the behavior of the ultimate controller and provide experience for optimizing the assets valuation of the directional issuance.