The Study Of The Rigging Performance Behaviour Of Strong Stock Holders Before The Directional Add-issuance

In recent years,directional add-issuance has gradually become the mainstream form of equity refinancing in listed companies,The original intention is to increase the diversity of financing channels for listed companies,inject high quality assets into the company,improve the management and the governance dilemma,and then promote the sound and fast development of listed companies.But due to the asymmetric information between the shareholders of listed companies and the existence of the control benefit in strong stock holders,adding the phenomenon of the shareholder,It is common occurance that strong stock holders use the convenience and concealment of directional add-issuance to invade and occupy the interests of medium and small shareholders.At present,the research of the academic community on the behavior of strong stock holders in directional add-issuance is mainly focused on the funding injection,related transactions and other aspects,however,the research on the manipulative behavior of strong stock holders is insufficient,which fall behind the demands on the practice of directional add-issuance.Therefore,it has important practical significance and theoretical significance to study the rigging performance behaviour of strong stock holders before the directional add-issuance.This paper is based on the wealth income model of various shareholders in the process of directional add-issuance,follows the premise of wealth maximization,gradually increases two constraint conditions of information asymmetry and control benefit under the conditions of the information which is original and complete,does a deep mathematical induction in the model,and discusses the motivation of benefit expropriation of strong stock holders who take advantage of directional add-issuance.At the same time,this paper use the data of listed companies in the manufacturing industry from 2012 to 2014,then use the mathematical software to carry on the empirical analysis according to the hypothesis.Firstly,this paper calculate the discretionary accruals of the major shareholder with participation and non-participation respectively,so as to verifies the existence of the performance maneuver of the major shareholders before the private placement through the zero mean test and multivariate regression equation analysis.Secondly,this paper use the test of variance and multiple regression equation to analyze the correlation between after the issuance of excess returns and pre-issuance performance of the the operation,so as to speculate performance-oriented motivation of the major shareholders in two different cases.Through theoretical and empirical research,the main conclusion of this paper is that the company will conduct negative performance manipulation before additional issue regardless of whether strong stock holders have participated in directional add-issuance.The performance of the pre-placement issuance has a positive impact on the short-term excess returns after the directional issuance,while the impact on the long-term excess returns is volatile.The major shareholder’s performance manipulation in the case of participation is mainly to meet personal interests needs,while the manipulation without the participation is a collusion with outside institutional investors.