| The reform of mixed ownership is one of the most controversial hot issues in the current state-owned enterprise reform research.In the process of introducing non-state-owned capital into state-owned enterprises,they may not only strengthen the financing constraints of enterprises due to budget constraints,but also optimize the corporate governance structure through the formation of multiple equity integration.Investment efficiency is the key index to evaluate enterprise value,but the existence of information asymmetry,principal-agent and other problems will have a negative impact on investment efficiency.In the process of state-owned enterprise reform,the introduction of non-state-owned capital has a checking and balancing effect on the behavior of state-owned enterprises,which can help to improve the problems of insider control and supervision failure caused by "one share is dominant",promote the formation of a reasonable right checking and balancing mechanism of state-owned enterprises,and ensure the fairness of investment decision-making.At the same time,the effective use of equity incentive will help to stimulate the positive behavior of state-owned enterprise executives and have a positive impact on the efficiency of enterprise investment.However,in practice,the nature of state-owned enterprises property rights leads to the complexity of equity incentives,and the impact on investment efficiency may be different due to the different structure of equity sources and the degree of checks and balances.Therefore,it is very important to explore the mixed ownership,equity incentive and investment efficiency of enterprises.This paper makes an analysis of the equity incentive policies and current situation of state-owned listed companies.Taking A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2018 as the research object,this paper empirically examines the effects of equity diversification and equity incentive on investment efficiency and their interaction with investment efficiency.Equity diversification is measured by two different ways of reform: quantitative change(mixed equity diversity)and qualitative change(mixed equity depth and mixed equity balance).This paper first uses Richardson(2006)residual measurement model to measure the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises,then tests the impact of equity incentive and equity diversification on investment efficiency,and finally tests the impact of the interaction between equity diversification and equity incentive on investment efficiency.In this paper,we find that:(1)The activity of equity incentives in state-owned enterprises is not as active as that in private enterprises.Although the number of equity incentives has increased,the proportion of equity incentives is relatively small,the level of incentives is not high,and the relevant policy provisions lack flexibility and lag behind;(2)There is a significant positive correlation between equity incentive and investment efficiency in state-owned enterprises;(3)The depth and balance of mixed equity have a negative impact on investment efficiency,but the diversity of mixed equity can significantly improve it;(4)There is substitution effect between mixed equity diversity and equity incentive,that is,with the increase of non-state-owned shareholders,the positive effect of equity incentive on investment efficiency is weakened,but the interaction of mixed equity depth,mixed equity balance and equity incentive has no significant impact on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. |
