| "There is a way,and then there is a way." With the continuous advancement of the comprehensive deepening of reform in China,the interest relationship between social individuals is increasingly complex,enterprises must clear their heads,deal with the relationship between local and overall,current and long-term,key and non-key,take the balance of advantages and disadvantages,seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages as an important principle,so as to choose the most favorable strategic decision-making plan.Investment activities are considered as an important part of the enterprise development process,so they are paid enough attention by the company's management and shareholders.But now there are a lot of enterprises in the investment efficiency is low,the efficiency of investment problems such as inadequate investment often happen,this not only will be idle and waste of resources,but also not conducive to the development of the enterprise itself,how to realize the optimization of investment level,reduce the efficiency of investment enterprises become a problem to be solved.The main purpose of this paper is to study whether the shareholding of controlling shareholders will affect the investment level of enterprises.How? The research focuses on the regulating effect of internal control quality on the relationship between shareholding and non-efficient investment of controlling shareholders,and finally draws a conclusion and puts forward a feasible method to alleviate the non-efficient investment behavior of enterprises.In this paper,on the basis of related research at home and abroad for reference,using the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory as the guidance,the controlling shareholder ownership,the concept of internal control quality and the efficiency of investment and research hypothesis is presented by theoretical analysis,A 2011-2018 China's Shanghai and shenzhen a-share listed companies as research samples,through descriptive statistics,the results of correlation analysis,regression analysis and so on,from the two aspects of equity attributes and ownership,to explore the efficiency of the enterprise investment controlling shareholder ownership as well as the influence of the internal control quality and the efficiency of investment controlling shareholder ownership regulation effect,and the research conclusion.The empirical analysis shows that:first,the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises.Secondly,the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the non-efficient investment at the significance level of 1%.Thirdly,internal quality control plays an important regulating role in inefficient investment of state-owned holding enterprises.Fourthly,the internal quality control of enterprises can effectively restrain the non-efficient investment phenomenon caused by the increase of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders.This paper discusses the economic benefits of internal control quality under the system of non-efficient investment,internal control quality of enterprises and shareholding of controlling shareholders,which is of guiding significance for listed companies to attach importance to the construction of internal control system and how to reduce the non-efficient investment of enterprises.State-owned holding enterprises should explore the causes of inefficient investment,rationally allocate and optimize resources,and make efficient investment.At the same time,enterprises need to focus on the improvement and construction of internal control system,not only to ensure that the quality of internal control gives full play to its own function in solving the problem of inefficient investment,but also to ensure that the adjustment of internal control quality is fully utilized to reduce the significant impact of shareholding ratio on inefficient investment. |
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