Research On The Relationship Between Internal Control Quality And Inefficient Investment Of State-owned Listed Companies

State-owned enterprises are the pillars of the national economy,hold the vitality of the national economy,State-owned enterprises in a dominant position in key areas of the national economy and important sectors,and play a decisive role in the development of the entire national economy.However,in recent years,state-owned listed companies that are in the midst of economic transition have often been labeled as irrational labels such as �expansion impulses� and �investment hunger�,which has greatly hindered the development of state-owned enterprises.Investment activities,as a company's extremely important strategic decision,are related to the sustainable and healthy development of the company.Therefore,finding ways to improve the problem of inefficient investment is a realistic problem that current state-owned enterprises need to solve urgently.After reviewing the research on non-efficiency investment in domestic and foreign scholars in recent years,this paper finds that information asymmetry and principal-agent problem are the triggers for non-efficiency investment,and internal control can effectively improve information asymmetry and principal-agent problems.Therefore,this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of internal control and non-efficiency investment by principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,behavioral finance and transaction cost theory,and selects the A-share main board of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during the three years from 2015 to 2017.Financial listed companies are the research objects,using Dibo internal control index to measure the internal control level of China's state-owned listed companies,using the Richardson residual measurement model to measure the level of non-efficiency investment,including over-investment and under-investment as explained Variables,internal control quality as explanatory variables,establish an internal control and non-efficiency investment relationship test model.The study found that non-efficiency investment problems existed in China's state-owned listed companies,especially the lack of investment.Internal control can curb excessive investment by state-owned listed companies,and it can also alleviate the problem of insufficient investment by state-owned listed companies.On this basis,according to the nature of different property rights,the state-owned enterprises are divided into local state-owned enterprises and central state-owned enterprises.It is found that compared with the central state-owned enterprises,the internal control of non-efficiency investment is more prominent in local state-owned enterprises;State-owned enterprises and commercial state-owned enterprises have found that the suppression of non-efficiency investment by commercial high-quality internal control is more obvious than that of public-owned state-owned enterprises.Finally,based on the research conclusions,this paper puts forward some suggestions for the state-owned enterprises to improve the internal control system and resolve the non-efficiency investment.This paper studies the relationship between internal control and non-efficiency investment from the perspective of state-owned enterprises,analyzes the characteristics of China's national conditions and state-owned enterprises,and further divides state-owned enterprises according to the two categories of property rights and business types,and divides state-owned enterprises into research.It enriches the research on the influencing factors of non-efficiency investment in state-owned enterprises.