Research On The Relationship Between CEO Tenure,Incentive And R&D Investment Of State-ownerd Enterprises

At present,the Sino-US trade war has entered a critical period,Sci-Tech innovation board has stepped onto the capital stage.Under the catalysis of 5G,AI and Beidou technologies,it is urgent for China to build an innovative country.As a micro subject under China's special system,state-owned enterprises face a huge historical mission and have a long way to go.However,there is room for improvement in R&D innovation intensity,CEO tenure and incentive system of state-owned enterprises at home and abroad.In this context,it is of theoretical and practical significance to explore the relationship between the three.Taking a total of 8090 CEO samples of A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2017 as the research object,this paper establishes a fixed effect regression model.Based on principal-agent theory,high-level echelon theory and incentive theory,this paper empirically studies the relationship between CEO tenure,incentive and R&D investment of state-owned enterprises.The main contents and findings of this paper are as follows:(1)Descriptive statistics show that the state-owned listed companies in China generally have low R&D investment intensity,short CEO tenure,frequent CEO turnover and weak incentive.(2)Empirical research on the relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment of state-owned enterprises reveals that,with the extension of CEO tenure in central state-owned enterprises and local stateowned enterprises,enterprises will invest more funds in R&D innovation;in local state-owned enterprises,CEO will significantly reduce R&D investment in the year of leaving office.(3)Empirical research on the relationship between CEO tenure,incentive and R&D investment shows that on-the-job consumption incentive will promote R&D of state-owned enterprises during CEO's tenure,and equity incentive will weaken their enthusiasm for R&D investment;on-the-job incentive and consumption incentive will weaken their negative willingness to R&D investment of enterprises when CEO is leaving office.(4)By comparing and analyzing the difference between central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises,we find that with the prolongation of CEO's incumbency time,incentives for salary and on-the-job consumption can increase the willingness of enterprises to invest in R&D.When CEO is leaving office,neither incentive can play an effective incentive role.With the extension of CEO's incumbency in local state-owned enterprises,on-the-job consumption incentives can enhance their enthusiasm for R&D investment in enterprises,while on-the-job consumption incentives can weaken their negative behavior of R&D investment in enterprises when CEO of local stateowned enterprises is leaving office.This paper realizes the innovation of research object and research content,and puts forward some suggestions on optimizing the tenure of CEO of state-owned enterprises and the replacement management system,perfecting the incentive system of senior managers in stateowned enterprises and relaxing the binding force of the government on central state-owned enterprises.It provides a reference solution for corporate governance and incentive channels to alleviate the deficiency of research and development of state-owned enterprises,and points out the limitations and possible research directions in the future.