Study On Major Shareholders' Tunneling Of ST Yinyi

In the 1970 s,China implemented the policy of reform and opening up,and China's capital market began to develop.With the development of economy,the problems of capital market and corporate governance are increasingly exposed.Because the ownership structure of many listed companies in China is relatively centralized,there is a conflict of interest between small and medium shareholders and large shareholders,which is mainly manifested in the tunneling behavior of large shareholders.In recent years,large shareholders occupy the funds of listed companies and other hollowing out behaviors occur frequently,which greatly damages the interests of small and medium shareholders,seriously hinders the healthy development of the company,and causes widespread concern of regulatory authorities,small and medium shareholders and other stakeholders.On the basis of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory,this paper comprehensively and systematically combs and studies the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of ST Yinyi,and finds that the major shareholders of ST Yinyi,that is,the actual controller,directly occupy the funds of listed companies through related party transactions.The main performance is occupying RMB 1.9billion paid by the listed company to Ningbo Ying Ri metal products Co.,Ltd.and Ningbo Zhuo Yue Sheng Long Co.,Ltd.by signing the intention agreement,and occupying nearly RMB 300 million of the house sales of the subsidiary Yinyi Xin Cheng directly on the basis of the current account.In addition to such explicit hollowing out behavior as fund occupation,there are also hidden hollowing out behaviors like excessive cash dividends and taking blood of listed companies.The main performance is that ST Yinyi announced to pay cash dividends of the previous year in 2018 under the condition of insufficient funds.The dividend amount is about 176% of the company's net profit in 2017.In this case,this paper analyzes the basic financial indicators,stock price changes and cumulative excess return of ST Yinyi,and reveals the specific impact of tunneling on the company and small and medium shareholders.It is found that the reasons why large shareholders are able to tunnel ST Yinyi are problems in the internal governance of the company,the defects in the internal control of the company,the lack of risk awareness and rights protection awareness of small and medium shareholders,and the lack of effective external supervision.In addition,based on the above four levels,this paper puts forward the corresponding preventive measures for the tunneling behavior of large shareholders:(1)Improving the internal governance of the company,strengthening equity checks and balances,and improving the independent director system.(2)Strengthening the internal control(3)Improving the investor protection mechanism and the awareness of small and medium-sized shareholders.(4)Strengthening the external supervision and the supervision of information disclosure and the punishment of illegal behaviors of controlling shareholders,strengthening the supervision of media and intermediary on listed companies,and strengthening the external audit.In order to provide experience for the prevention of tunneling,protect the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders,and maintain the good development of the capital market.