Research On Controlling The Expropriation Behavior Of Small And Medium-sized Shareholders By Control Of Large Shareholders

In the traditional corporate governance problem,under the decentralized ownership structure,the agency issue between the internal management and the shareholders of the listed company is the focus of attention,but with the in-depth study of scholars from various countries,it is found that the main conflict in the modern company is not Then there is the conflict between shareholders and managers,but it is the conflict of interests between major shareholders and small and medium shareholders.In order to alleviate the large shareholders' encroachment on the interests of small and medium shareholders and other reasons,China's share reform has been implemented.However,in the era of total circulation,the incidents of large shareholders' interest infringement still occur frequently,and in China,the phenomenon of controlling large shareholders is prevalent in capital.In the market,compared with the state-owned enterprises,the majority shareholders of private enterprises are more likely to obtain more private benefits of control by strengthening their control over the company when the legal environment of our country is not perfect.Because of the inconsistency of control rights and ownership,when the controlling power of a large shareholder is higher than the ownership it owns,the possibility of interest infringement is also higher.Under the phenomenon of controlling large shareholders,the way of carrying out profit appropriation is also increasingly complicated and hidden,causing major losses to small and medium shareholders,which seriously hampers the healthy development of China's capital market.In recent years,small and medium shareholders and other interests in the company Relevant people attach more and more importance to behaviors in which the major shareholders infringe on the interests of the company's investors.It is very important to study the encroachment behavior of large shareholders in the current capital market in China.Through the combing of existing literature,it is found that most of the existing studies have studied profit appropriation under the control of large shareholders from the perspective of the pyramid equity structure and cross-shareholding,while the benefit appropriation has been achieved through the enhanced control of large shareholders as senior executives.There is less research,but in this case,the behavior of profit appropriation is more subtle and difficult to find.It is easy to bypass the internal supervision department and the possibility of being examined is relatively small.This means that it is a major shareholder of listed companies in China.The issue of control,especially the study of large shareholders as senior executives,has become more than necessary and urgent.This article revolves around the behaviors of interest expropriation under the control of large shareholders,starting from the causes of the control of large shareholders,and using Mianshi Investment's major shareholders to carry out an in-depth analysis of the cases of small and medium-sized shareholders in the implementation of their interests.Firstly,the background and significance of the study are expounded in general,and the domestic and foreign literatures on the control of large shareholder and the behavior of interest infringement are briefly reviewed and summarized.Then the relevant concepts and theoretical basis involved in the paper are described.Secondly,it introduced the basic situation of Mianshi investment and the incidents of misappropriation of interests.At the same time,based on specific events,it briefly analyzed the specific means and economic consequences of the major shareholders of Mianshi investment for the encroachment of interests;finally,proceeded from the reasons for the occurrence of profit appropriation.The countermeasures and suggestions to curb the expropriation of major shareholders are summarized.The conclusion of this paper is that the defects in the equity structure of Chinese listed companies,the immature governance of the company,and the weak regulatory environment in China are the major shareholder control of Mianshi Investment,which leads to the profit appropriation.The main reason.Because China's capital market is a factor in its own development,the research in this paper can provide a limited reference for the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders.Next,it proposes some suggestions for deterring the behaviors of the interests of the minority shareholders resulting from the control of large shareholders:(1)Optimize internal governance,avoid excessive ownership concentration or excessively dispersed ownership structure,form equity checks and balances;(2)Improve external supervision,combine the spontaneous regulatory power of the market,self-discipline of securities institutions,and the formation of compulsory supervision with government departments The system will gradually form a sound supervision mechanism in the market;(3)Strengthen the awareness of shareholder rights and further promote the adequacy of information disclosure so as to guide the self-protection of small and medium shareholders.