Remanufacturing Decision Research Based On Integrity Market And Remanufacturing Mode Of Third Party Enterprises

Environmental pollution and resource shortage are becoming more and more serious.Remanufacturing can not only solve the problems of environmental degradation and resource shortage,but also bring economic benefits to enterprises.Due to the lack of market supervision and corporate integrity,price cheating in the reproduct market is emerging one after another,which severely damages the benefits of consumers and the effectiveness of market allocation.Patent licensing brings convenience to the production of remanufactured products by independent remanufacturers.Moreover,remanufacturing technology innovation is an effective way to maintain the cost advantage of remanufactured products.So we comprehensively apply evolutionary game theory,Stackelberg game theory and consumer behavior theory to study the price cheating in the reproduct market and the decision-making of enterprises in patent licensing and remanufacturing technology innovation under the remanufacturing mode of third-party enterprises.The main research of this paper is divided into the following two parts:In the first part,we study the price cheating on remanufactured products in closed-loop supply chain.Firstly,we construct an evolutionary game composed of the seller and the consumer,and analyze the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies with Jacobi matrix.The results show that when the difference between the camouflaged selling price and the camouflaged cost of the remanufactured product is smaller than the non-camouflaged selling price of the remanufactured product,the seller chooses not to camouflage,and the consumer chooses to buy,and the reproduct market is effective.Secondly,considering the rewards or punishments of government for the seller,we establish an evolutionary game composed of the seller,the consumer and the government,and analyze the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies with Jacobi matrix.The results show that the government actively inspects the reproduct market,and increases the rewards and punishments,which can promote the seller to choose not to camouflage,the consumer to choose to buy,and the market to achieve effective allocation.Finally,we verify the correctness of the corresponding conclusions with numerical analysis.In the second part,we consider the effects of both patent licensing and remanufacturing technology innovation on the remanufacturing decisions of the original manufacturer and the independent remanufacturer.Firstly,we study the influencing factors for the strategy selection and the evolutionary stability strategy of the original manufacturer and the independent remanufacturer by evolutionary game.The results show that the original manufacturer always chooses the patent licensing strategy,while the independent remanufacturer chooses the remanufacturing technology innovation strategy when the output level of remanufacturing technology innovation is less than a certain threshold.Secondly,we apply Stackelberg game to solve the optimal decision of the original manufacturer and the independent remanufacturer in two remanufacturing modes: the mode of patent license and remanufacturing technology innovation and the mode of patent license and no remanufacturing technology innovation.Finally,through comparative analysis and numerical simulation,we discuss the effects of different parameters on the output level of remanufacturing technology innovation,patent license fee per unit product,retail prices of new products and remanufactured products,and profits of the original manufacturer and the independent remanufacturer.The results show that compared to the mode of patent license and no remanufacturing technology innovation,the optimal patent license fee per unit product,the optimal retail price of new products,the optimal profits of the original manufacturer and the independent remanufacturer in the mode of patent license and remanufacturing technology innovation are bigger,and the optimal retail price of remanufactured products in the mode of patent license and remanufacturing technology innovation are smaller.