Study On Risk Efficiency Of Commercial Banks Based On Stickiness Of Executive Compensation

The financial crisis has caused shocks in the world's financial markets and triggered global financial regulatory changes.Although China's current financial capital market is not mature enough,the problem of sky-high compensation for financial executives has gradually developed,which has caused risk loopholes in China's commercial banks.The exposure is getting worse.How to curb this trend and improve the risk efficiency of banks at the same time is worth pondering.Based on this,this paper analyzes the operating data and executive compensation of 14 commercial banks in China,evaluates the stickiness of executive compensation and the efficiency of risk management of commercial banks,and tests the stickiness of executive compensation and the risk efficiency of banks and their influencing factors.Causality,and put forward mechanisms and strategies to improve the risk efficiency of China's commercial banks based on the stickiness of executive compensation.It also improves the research on the influencing factors of the risk efficiency of China's commercial banks,enriches the evaluation areas of the stickiness and risk efficiency of executive compensation in China's commercial banks,and improves the risk efficiency of banks and the risk management capabilities of China's commercial banks.Relying on the basic theoretical foundations such as principal-agent theory,optimal contract theory,manager power theory,and incentive theory,this paper uses the model calculation method to measure the salary stickiness of executives of listed commercial banks in China.The SBM model measures the risk efficiency of listed commercial banks in China,and then analyzes the stickiness and risk efficiency of executive compensation of Chinese commercial banks through comparative studies.Finally,the empirical research method is used to explore the stickiness of executive compensation and the risk efficiency of commercial banks and their impact.The influence relationship of the factors proves that there is an influence relationship between the two.It can be seen from the research that the stickiness of remuneration of executives of commercial banks and the risk efficiency of commercial banks have a causal relationship,that is,the stickiness of remuneration of executives of commercial banks has a short-term impact on the risk efficiency of commercial banks,and from a long-term perspective Stickiness is negatively related to the risk efficiency of commercial banks.The stickiness of the pay of commercial bank executives is negatively correlated with the non-performing loans of commercial banks.The stickiness of the pay of commercial bank executives is negatively correlated with the size of the labor force.Commercial bank executives' salary stickiness and operating costs are positively correlated.Based on the results of this research,a risk management capability improvement mechanism and external improvement measures for commercial banks based on the stickiness of executive compensation are proposed,thereby realizing the management and control of the stickiness of executive compensation of commercial banks and the improvement of risk efficiency of commercial banks.