Research On The Stickiness Of Executive Compensation Of Listed Companies In China 's Small And Medium - Sized Enterprises

Establishing a modern enterprise system, is a milestone in modern enterprise development. It provides a good regulatory framework for the future development. Under this regulatory framework, the ownership and management of the company will be to achieve the separation, between shareholders and executives will be an agency relationship, but because of the asymmetric information, different interest objectives, which of them pursued caused a lot of agency problems. The creation of executive compensation mechanism is considered to be one of the most effective ways to solve the agency problem, establish a good executive compensation mechanism can promote the interests of executives and shareholders’interests tend to be consistent, and finally achieve win-win situation of mutual interest. In recent years, company executives got tens of millions huge salaries, but the performance of companies they managed is unsatisfactory, so this phenomenon has aroused further ponder of the majority of scholars.The small and medium enterprise board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange play an important role in china’s economic development. Scholars have studied on the stickiness characteristic existence of executive compensation from different angles, including research on the state-owned business and the manufacturing of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange. Therefore, further research has greater significance of the small and medium enterprise board. The small and medium enterprise board listed company is characterized by the presence of sticky, the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration have effects on stickiness characteristics of executive compensation has more value to further study.Based on the domestic and international research literature carding and analysis, the use of executive compensation theory as a basis for 2011-2013 of the small and medium enterprise board of listed companies as samples, four hypotheses proposed for the issues, were established four empirical models to test the hypothesis. Collect relevant data from the annual reports of listed companies and financial websites, using methods of descriptive statistics and regression analysis of empirical test, the test results show that the first, the small and medium enterprise board listed company executive pay and corporate performance management are relevant, that is, when the company When increased performance, executive pay will increase, and vice versa when the company’s performance declined, executive pay will be reduced. Second, executive compensation, has stickiness characteristics, that is, when the marginal increase in performance of the company to increase the amount of executive compensation is significantly higher than when the marginal reduction in the amount of executive pay at the company’s performance declined. Third, the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration have effects on stickiness characteristics of executive compensation, mainly for executive pay can be effectively suppressed stickiness, for example, the higher the proportion of independent directors, executive compensation stickiness will be lower; The higher the ownership concentration, the more stickiness characteristics can be suppressed executive compensation. Then summarize the conclusions of empirical study, and make relevant policy recommendations based on the conclusions, meanwhile shows the existence of deficiencies and limitations of this study in order to provide the future research directions for further study.