Research On Supply Chain Contract Under Symmetric And Asymmetric Capacity Information

In the high-tech industry,in order to get products to the market quickly to seize market share,large manufacturers often require suppliers to invest in related components in advance during product development,so capacity investment under random demand affects supply The important factor of chain profit.However,too much capacity investment will cause suppliers to face more cash flow risks,and too little capacity investment will cause retailers to lose sales revenue.Aiming at the capacity contradiction between supply and demand sides,this paper focuses on the symmetry and misalignment of capacity information as the core in the case of random demand,and separately studies how retailers design and select supply chain contracts to find the optimal contract under the corresponding system.In mechanism design,retailers provide contract parameters and contract types to suppliers,and suppliers need to make decisions about the optimal level of capacity investment.In the case of information symmetry,four incentive mechanisms were designed,from the perspective of revenue and the perspective of production capacity,respectively: wholesale price contract,revenue sharing contract,linear contract and production cost sharing contract.In addition,since the capacity cost is the private information of the supplier,the problem of the retailer's selection of the contract menu when the capacity information is asymmetric is studied.Through mathematical modeling,we determine the optimal contract menu designed for different types of suppliers under the four contracts,and analyze and compare the performance of different contracts.Finally,the numerical simulation work is carried out through matlab.The results show that under the condition of symmetric information,the linear contract and the capacity cost sharing contract can better promote suppliers to invest in production capacity.At the same time,under the capacity cost sharing contract and the revenue sharing contract,retailers can obtain Higher yield.Under the asymmetric production capacity information,the performance of the production cost sharing contract is the best.The retailer can not only obtain higher profits,but also better reveal the real capacity information of the supplier,compared with the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing.The contract effect is poor.