Research On Coordination Strategy Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Under Free-riding Behavior Of Customer

In recent years,e-commerce has developed rapidly.In this context,more and more traditional enterprises keep their original retail channels and open up network channels to form a dual channel sales model.At the same time,it also derived the online goods brand which depends on the direct network channel.Compared with traditional retail channels,online channels can not meet the needs of consumers to experience products before purchase.Pre sales service is the natural advantage of traditional retail channels,and the difference between channels leads to a new consumer phenomenon: service free riding behavior.Hitchhiking stimulates consumers’ purchase desire and improves market vitality,but it also makes the conflict between manufacturers and retailers more and more obvious.How to reduce the adverse effect of free rider behavior on supply chain is a hot topic in supply chain management.Therefore,this paper studies the decision-making and supply chain coordination of manufacturers and retailers in different decision-making modes for the supply chain system composed of traditional brand manufacturers,online brand manufacturers and traditional retailers.First of all,based on the background of brand and channel competition,considering the free riding behavior of consumers,this paper establishes the profit function of each channel in the supply chain according to the two decision-making modes of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making,and uses the game theory to find out the optimal price and service level under different decision-making modes.And use matlab simulation to explore the influence of free rider coefficient on pricing,service level,demand and profit of each channel.The results show that: under the two decision-making modes,the free riding behavior of consumers will lead to the decrease of service level of retailers and the decrease of total profit of traditional brand dual channels.For traditional brand dual channels,the total profit of supply chain under centralized decision is higher than that under decentralized decisionSecondly,based on the conclusion of the third chapter,we introduce cost sharing contract,revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract to coordinate the traditional brand dual channel supply chain.This paper studies the optimal pricing and service decision-making under three coordination mechanisms,and analyzes the influence of free riding coefficient on service,pricing,demand and profit under different coordination contracts through MATLAB numerical simulation.The results show that three kinds of contracts can encourage retailers to improve service level,among which cost sharing contract is the most effective,but it is easy to be affected by free riding behavior.In terms of improving the profit of each channel,the profit of traditional brand supply chain and each channel under revenue sharing contract and quantity discount contract is higher than decentralized decision-making.Cost sharing contract needs to consider the influence of free riding coefficient.When the free riding coefficient is small,that is to say,there is less free riding behavior in the market,cost sharing contract can not improve the profits of all channels.Finally,the paper summarizes the whole paper,draws the conclusions and management enlightenment,and on this basis,puts forward suggestions for the future research direction of free riding behavior.