Study On Coordinative Mechanisms Of The Bidi Rectional Free-Riding Bihavior Under The Condition Of The Dual-Channel Supply Chain Study

As the electronic commerce market getting more and more mature, more and more enterprises on the basis of the traditional retail channels opened up a direct sales network channels. Dual channel operation has become a trend in the Internet era of enterprise channels to adapt to market demand. Enjoyed more choices in the double channel of consumption environment, consumers can easily convert from one channel to the other channel that the dued channel which consumers obtain product information service is not necessarily the final purchase channels. For example, many consumers will go to the store to understand the experience of the product firstly before the purchase of products, and then choose to buy the product at a lower price in the network channel; At the same time,there are many consumers would like to go to the network channel to look for product information,such as product quality, performance and price,finally complete purchases at a nearby store. The conversion behavior, so that the cost of the channel loss of service costs due to sales, but not the corresponding channels of service costs have been free to obtain the increase in sales. The conversion of the above acts make the channal which provided information services lose the dued sales while the corresponding channel which does not provide information services has free access to get the increase of sales. This free-riding behavior is bound to generate channel conflict, enterprises need to strengthen the channel management and explore a coordination strategy of dual-channel supply chain to achieve a win-win situation.This paper based on dual channel bidirectional free-riding problem, considering that the influence of bidirectional free-riding behavior and dual-channel service costs on the equilibrium profit and supply chain performance under different decision model,then find a feasible interest coordination mechanism which improves the dual-channel performance.The main results were as follows.In the centralized decision mode, the bidirectional free-riding could increase supply chain profits, however, higher dual-channel service costs would reduce the overall profit.Managers should create conditions for the bidirectional free-riding behavior which depends on information services, making each channel get benefit from other’s information consulting and advertising service.In the decentralized decision mode, service costs of each channel could reduce the profit of the supply chain members, and bidirectional free-riding caused by overflowservices would be benefit for both channels. Supply chain members’ profits in this decision model is less than the system profit in the centralized decision. this paper introduced a revenue sharing contract in order to promote the dual-channel supply chain coordination, it is concluded that only when met certain conditions manufacturer could adjust the revenue sharing proportion of contract to in cooperation with the retailer,realize profits from both sides get Pareto improvement,achieve win-win situation. Finally this paper elaborated the practice case of enterprise using this coordination mechanism.