Research On Pricing Strategy Of Crowdsourcing Logistics Platform Considering Public Participation

Crowdsourcing logistics platform,as an intermediate service-oriented platform connecting the employer and the receiver,makes profits by charging service fees to two-sided users.As a platform based on social public participation,different levels of public participation will affect the normal completion rate of orders on the platform,and then the platform needs to subsidize special orders to ensure that orders are carried.How can the platform subsidize special orders and charge bilateral users according to different levels of public participation to maximize the balanced profit? What kind of impact will the user's ownership behavior have on the platform's balanced profit? How should the platform charge the bilateral users when the ownership behavior of users' is different?Based on the theory of two-sided market,this paper takes the crowdsourcing logistics platform and its two-sided users as the research object,analyzes the influence of the degree of public participation and the subsidy amount of the platform to the special order on the maximum profit of the platform and the equilibrium price of the platform charge the bilateral users.In addition,the paper compares the maximum profit of the platform and the equilibrium price of the platform charge the bilateral users when the ownership behavior of the bilateral user is different.First of all,this paper studies the equilibrium profit of crowdsourcing logistics platform and the equilibrium pricing of the platform charge the bilateral users when the public participation and subsidies exist in the monopoly market,and analyzes the pricing structure of the platform and puts forward several suggestions.In order to achieve the maximum profit,the platform needs to adjust the price that platform charges the bilateral users according to the degree of public participation,so as to attract more users to join the platform and achieve the profit.Then,when there are two crowdsourcing logistics platforms in the competitive market,the maximum profit of crowdsourcing logistics platform and the equilibrium pricing of the platform charge bilateral users are studied.The pricing structure of crowdsourcing logistics platform is analyzed and some suggestions are provided.Finally,through the analysis of the crowdsourcing logistics platform T in the market,the important data in the operation is extracted.Then,MATLAB R2016 a is used to analyze the maximum profit and equilibrium pricing of platform T.Finally,some suggestions are given.The above content provides theoretical and practical basis for the study of the equilibrium pricing and equilibrium profit of crowd sourcing logistics platform relying on the participation of the public.