The Study On The Effect Of Venture Capital On The Sensitivity Between Executive Compensation And Performance Of Listed Companies On The Growth Enterprise Market

While providing financial support for enterprises,venture capital institutions will actively participate in the operation and management of enterprises,and play its role of supervision and incentive,so as to improve the corporate governance ability and reduce the agency cost between the management and shareholders.At the same time,as an important part of corporate governance,executive compensation system plays an important role in improving the principalagent problem.Therefore,the study of the impact of venture capital on sensitivity between executive compensation and performance will help to understand the role of venture capital in corporate governance and improve the role of executive compensation system in corporate governance.Based on the analysis of the theories of venture capital and executive compensation,this paper takes principal-agent theory as the starting point to explore the impact of venture capital on the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance,and puts forward relevant assumptions.This paper empirically tests the impact of venture capital intervention and venture capital characteristics on the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance of listed companies with a total of 4077 samples of 737 companies,which were listed in the Growth Enterprise Market from 2009 to 2018.The main conclusions of this paper are four parts.(1)The participation of venture capital significantly improves the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance.As the key to solve the principal-agent problem and improve the level of corporate governance,the optimization of executive compensation system is one of the means for venture capital institutions to participate in the operation and management of the invested enterprises and realize the role of supervision and incentive;(2)Compared with non-state-owned venture capital,companies invested by state-owned venture capital institutions have higher sensitivity between executive compensation and performance.The state-owned venture capital relies on more mature investment and operation experience,which has great advantages in improving the governance level of the target company and optimizing the salary incentive mechanism.(3)Joint investment does not significantly affect the sensitivity of executive compensation company performance.(4)The higher the shareholding ratio of venture capital,the higher the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance.When venture capital institutions hold a higher proportion of shares,the optimization effect of executive compensation incentive system is more significant.Finally,according to the research results,this paper puts forward suggestions: first,improve the corporate governance system,establish a reasonable salary incentive mechanism;second,encourage the development of venture capital,improve the construction of capital market.