Listed Company Executive Compensation And Corporate Performance Sensitivity Studies

This paper studies the executives’compensation-performance sensitivity of China’s listed companies based on the perspective of different ultimate controllers,the study found:(1)the compensation-performance sensitivity of executives of listed companies under different controllers from weak to strong is:entral government-controlled enterprises,local government-controlled enterprises and non-government-controlled enterprises.(2)the remuneration of executives of listed companies has significant viscosity characteristics,further sub-sample study found that corporate executives’payment under central government control there is no significant viscosity characteristics, local government control enterprises and non-government-controlled companies’executive compensation have obvious viscous characteristics.On the one hand,this shows China’s listed companies have been established the compensation contract system based on the performance of the executives.On the other hand it also reflects that the executives’compensation of Chinese listed companies is unreasonable,namely the corporate executive payment under control of local government and non-government-controlled companies amply rewarded lightly punished.This study has theoretical and practical significance,theoretically provided a hierarchical management idea to corporate governance of listed companies, provided a theoretical basis for policy,practically also provided a appropriate guidance of executive pay for the development of China’s listed companies.The author at the time of the sort found in relevant literature,from the perspective of the ultimate controller of the executive compensation and corporate performance study of the sensitivity of the literature are few, based on this article from the incentive theory,the optimal contract theory and the theory proposed power manager the underlying assumptions of this article,and then select our Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed company data2010-2012as the research sample,a measure of operating performance of listed companies consolidated using principal component analysis,respectively,from the executive compensation and corporate performance sensitive and executive compensation sticky build regression models in two dimensions,and finally,to verify the hypothesis of this research is theoretical analysis and empirical research method of combining,drawn conclusions of this study.Finally,according to the classification and categorization of design ideas for optimizing corporate executive payment under the ultimate controllers of different backgrounds to provide relevant policy recommendations,in addition, to study the executives’compensation-performance sensitivity as well as the remuneration of listed companies from organizational behavior perspective is a future direction.