Research On The Impact Of The Firm Investment Efficiency Made By The Audit Quality And Property Right Nature

As one of the important activity,investment decision has a significant impact on the company's financing policy and dividend distribution policy,and is the basis for the company to obtain sustainable development cash flow.According to the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,with the emergence of principal-agent relationship,the company's ownership and management rights are increasingly separated,resulting in information asymmetry.In this case,managers may give priority to human intervention on the company's investment decision-making based on personal interests,and ultimately the company's investment efficiency is influenced.In terms of investment efficiency,it is vulnerable to the impact of audit quality and property rights.On the one hand,according to the modern audit theory,as an independent external supervision mechanism,audit can supervise the investment activities of listed companies independently from the company,and prevent the listed companies from using the inefficient investment behavior for earnings management.On the other hand,according to the theory of property rights,economic organizations with different property rights have different economic activities.Due to the nature of public property rights,the separation of ownership and management rights of state-owned listed companies is relatively high,and managers may produce inefficient investment behaviors based on private interests.Non state-owned listed companies will be limited by credit guarantee and many other restrictions in the financing process,resulting in the lack of rich cash flow for investment activities,resulting in insufficient investment.The accounting firm will not be interfered by any party to independently issue audit opinions on the investment activities of listed companies with different property rights,which will ultimately affect the investment decisions of listed companies.In view of their important role in corporate investment,we should study the relationship between them and investment efficiency,and conduct in-depth research on the regulatory role of property right nature in audit quality and investment efficiency.Based on the comprehensive review of the relevant research results of domestic and foreign scholars in the aspects of audit quality,property right nature and corporate investment efficiency,and based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and property right theory,this paper systematically uses normative research and empirical research methods to analyze the impact of audit quality and property right nature on corporate investment efficiency.In the research,the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2018 are selected as the research objects,and the regulatory effects of property rights are innovatively introduced for empirical research.Through the research,we find that audit quality has a significant negative correlation with over investment,and a negative correlation with under investment,but the effect is not obvious.At the same time,in the state-owned listed companies,audit quality has a more obvious inhibition effect on the over investment behavior.In the non-state-owned listed companies,audit quality can prevent the under investment behavior to some extent,but the effect is not significant.According to the research conclusion,the paper puts forward that listed companies should pay attention to the impact of audit quality and property right nature on investment efficiency,relevant government departments should issue corresponding policies to support and guide listed companies to improve investment efficiency,financial supervision departments should relax financing constraints,and accounting offices should improve audit quality.