Research On Quality Of Accounting Information For Investment Efficiency

The correctness of the investment decision and the effectiveness of investment behavior have an important impact on the survival and development of enterprises.It can be said that the investment efficiency directly impact on the long-term interests of enterprises. The existing studies suggest that in a mature capital market, by relieving the principal-agent conflict, reducing the adverse selection and improving contract supervision, high-quality accounting information can improve the efficiency of investment. However, in our immature capital market, there is little research about its empirical study, and accounting information quality index is single, so the study results are not robust. Also there is very little research on different adjustment variables.Based on this idea, this paper, on the basis of literature, uses the principal-agent theory and asymmetric information theory to analyze the impact of the quality of accounting information on the efficiency of investment. On this basis, based on the quality of information disclosure, auditing supervision, ownership structure, this paper analyses the effect of the quality of accounting information on corporate investment efficiency. Then 10 research hypotheses are proposed, the relational model about the impact of the quality of accounting information on the efficiency of investment is established, and this paper gives an empirical test using three-year data (2009-2011) of the corporations on the Main Board of "Shenzhen A" as the sample data. In this test, we use percentile method to get the accounting information quality comprehensive index, use non-efficiency investments as the measure of the efficiency of investment variables, and the Richardson model for calculation. At last, statistical methods, such as Descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, and multiple linear regression analysis and so on, are used to verify assumptions.The results show that:(1)high-quality accounting information can inhibit (ease) overinvestment (underinvestment) remarkably; (2) The higher the quality of information disclosure, the inhibition of the quality of accounting information on excessive investment increases significantly, but the relief on underinvestment does not enhance significantly; (3)the higher audit quality, the inhibition of the quality of accounting information on excessive investment increases significantly, but the relief on underinvestment does not enhance significantly; (4) the higher the degree of ownership concentration, the inhibition of the quality of accounting information on excessive investment decreases significantly, but the relief on underinvestment does not significantly decreases; The higher the degree of ownership balance, the inhibition of the quality of accounting information on excessive investment does not increase significantly, but the relief effect on underinvestment increases significantly.