Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge,Shareholding Structure And Investment Efficiency

Although the equity pledge business originated in 1995,it only officially took the stage after the release of the "Procedures for Stock Pledged Repo Transactions and Registration and Settlement Business(Trial)" in 2003,and entered the public's vision.The reason why the equity pledge is sought after by companies with higher financing constraints,such as private enterprises,is considered to be due to the following three reasons:First,compared with credit loans,equity pledges have looser conditions for obtaining funds and fewer use restrictions.Second,unless the stock price drops sharply,shareholders will not lose control of the company,and it will still be able to influence the company's major decisions.Third,the requirement for equity pledged shares is low,and restricted shares can also be pledged,which has alleviated the limit of the financial pressure caused by the failure to sell shares.However,the decline in the stock market in 2017 and the high percentage of pledges and bursts in many companies in 2018 also forced companies and investors to be wary of the risks posed by equity pledges.The risks are multifaceted,including not only the impact on the enterprise itself,such as the possible loss of control or bankruptcy,but also the securities companies that are connected to it,and even the stability of the entire stock market For an enterprise,its main financial activities include financing activities and investment activities,etc.The funds obtained from equity pledge financing activities will be used by the enterprise to carry out investment activities in order to obtain investment income to repay the equity pledge funds and add corporate value.Therefore,how the efficiency of the pledged investment activities plays a crucial role in the future development of the enterprise.In this context,this article focuses on the behavior of equity pledge,specifically studies the impact of this behavior of the controlling shareholder on the investment efficiency of the enterprise,and introduces the adjustment factor of the equity structure to try to prove that the equity structure regulates the relationship between the two through empirical research.It is expected that the risk that may occur to shareholders'equity pledges can be avoided by cutting from the shareholding structure.This article first explains the research background of equity pledge,investment efficiency,and equity structure,expounds the research significance of this paper,lists the research content and specific framework of this paper,and selects a combination of literature analysis and empirical research methods,the innovation points of this article are proposed;secondly,the literature related to equity pledge,investment efficiency,equity structure and controlling shareholder behavior is sorted out,and the existing research is reviewed;then on this basis,the relevant issues involved in this article are collated concept and theoretical basis,on the premise of the theoretical basis,put forward the three theoretical assumptions of this article;then,a descriptive statistical analysis of each variable,and the correlation analysis of each variable from the perspective of overinvestment and underinvestment,excluding the problem of multicollinearity,on this basis,panel data was used to perform multiple regression analysis to verify the three hypotheses mentioned in this article,and sensitivity analysis and propensity score matching method were used to test the robustness of the conclusions obtained by empirical analysis.Based on the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical verification,the research conclusion of this paper is drawn,in addition to point out the shortcomings of this article,the future research directions are suggested.This article collects and organizes the data of 2010-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the target sample,discusses the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and corporate investment efficiency,and the adjustment effect of the equity structure on the two,according to the panel data multiple regression.The results come to the following conclusions:First,compared with companies without equity pledges,controlling shareholders' equity pledges will lead to inefficient investments of listed companies,and such inefficient investments by enterprises include underinvestment and overinvestment.Second,listing the nature of the company's equity has a moderating effect on the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and non-efficient investment.Compared with the state-owned enterprise,the non-state-owned enterprise's controlling shareholder's equity pledge has a greater impact on the company's investment efficiency.Third,the regulatory effect of corporate equity checks and balances on equity pledges and investment efficiency is negative,that is,the higher the degree of equity checks and balances in the listing formula,the lower the degree of inefficient investment by the controlling shareholder after equity pledge.Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research,this paper expands the research space between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and the enterprise's investment efficiency,and further introduces the equity structure as a regulating variable,which provides a research basis for studying the mechanism between the two to a certain extent.