Study On The Effect Of Stock Pledge Of Stockholders Of Listed Companies On Stock Price Synchronzation

Stock Price Synchronization refers to the "same-to-same-to-same-slip" phenomenon of stock prices,that is,the linkage between listed companies and stock market volatility.Existing studies have found that there is a negative correlation between stock price Synchronicity and the level of corporate trait information that is integrated into stock prices.The equity pledge refers to the means by which the equity holder pledges its own equity to financial institutions such as banks and securities companies as collateral for financing.When the stock price drops sharply,the equity pledge will bring the risk of control transfer and self-owned wealth loss to the pledgee.For the purpose of reducing risk,the controlling shareholder may collude with the management to conduct information manipulation and conceal negative news to maintain the stock price.Stability,and this behavior will reduce the company's information disclosure quality,thereby improving the level of information asymmetry between management and investors,reducing the integration of the company's stock quality information,and then improve the stock price SynchronizationIn the first part of the empirical study,we selected data samples of all the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2012-2016 and tested whether the shareholder equity pledge of the controlling shareholder will affect the stock price synchronization of the listed company through the propensity score matching(PSM)model.The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between equity pledge of controlling shareholders and stock price Synchronization.Listed companies with equity pledge activities are more likely to have listed companies with no pledged behavior.Their share price Synchronization after pledge will increase,and the performance of individual stocks will improve.In the process of further demonstrating whether the listed company's equity attributes will affect the correlation between the two,this paper finds that non-state-owned holding companies compared to state-owned holding companies,their controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior and stock prices The positive correlation of synchronization is slightly stronger.In the second part of the empirical analysis,the earnings management level calculated by the modified Jones model was used as a measure of the company's information disclosure quality index.Multiple linear regression was used to verify that the controlling shareholders' equity pledged behavior was negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure.The equity Synchronization and information disclosure quality were positive.relationship.After the equity pledge,the controlling shareholder may maintain the stock price through the market value management,which reduces the disclosure quality of the listed company and improves the synchronization of the stock price.