Research On The Influence Of The Shareholding Ratio Of Executives On The Governance Performance Of Private Listed Companies

In the process of development in private listed enterprises,due to the refinement of the division of labor,the management rights and ownership are separated from each other,resulting in agency problems.In order to reduce the economic losses caused by agency costs and information asymmetry,some private listed companies adopt equity incentive plans,so equity becomes an important part of the management compensation structure.As an important decision-maker in the governance process of private listed companies,senior management has a certain degree of influence on corporate governance performance,and the shareholding plan is a long-term incentive for senior management of the company,which is beneficial to the development of enterprises.The shareholding plan has become the main way for modern private enterprises to reduce agency costs.Based on the current governance problems of private listed companies in China,this paper studies the impact of the shareholding ratio of executives on corporate governance performance.In order to clarify the impact of management shareholding of private listed companies on governance performance in the governance process,this paper uses a combination of empirical analysis and theoretical analysis to construct a regression measurement model of the impact of executive shareholding ratio on corporate governance performance.The paper takes the private listed companies in China from 2011 to 2017 as the research objects,collecting relevant data and using statistical software to process these data.Adopting principal component factor analysis and multiple regression analysis to do empirical analysis of the interest convergence effect and management defense effect of executives' shareholdings on corporate governance performance of private listed companies,as well as an alternative analysis of the two effects,then discussing the regulatory effect of the the shareholding ratio of equity between the relationship of executives and governance performance of private listed companies.The results show that there is a non-linear relationship between the shareholding ratio of executives and the governance performance of private listed companies,and it has a Inverted"U" shape relationship of rising at first and then falling;The influence of the shareholding ratio of executives on the governance performance of private listed companies has a range effect,when the shareholding ratio of executives is less than 34%,the effect of interest convergence dominates,When the shareholding ratio of executives is more than 34%,the management defense effect dominates;the equity balance has a significant regulatory effect between the relationship of the shareholding ratio of executives and private listed corporate governance performance,When the equity balance is higher,as the shareholding ratio of executives rises,the governance performance of private listed companies is higher than that of low equity balances.Based on empirical analysis results,then suggestions for the development of private listed companies are proposed:optimize equity incentive measures,improving the internal contract system,strengthening the introduction and training of management talents and cooperation with universities,government supervision agencies standardize the information disclosure system of private listed companies.