The Influence Of Loan Guarantee Insurance On Farmers' Credit Rationing

As a large agricultural country,China's agriculture,rural areas and farmers is always the foundation and support for national stability and development.Under the background of the structural reform of agricultural supply side,China's rural areas are gradually transforming from traditional agriculture to modem agriculture,and some farmers are gradually declining from commodity producers to livelihood type small farmers,part-time producers and even out of agriculture,while the other changes into new agricultural management subjects,such as big farmers,family farms and farmers' professional cooperatives.Compared with the traditional small scale management mode,the scale and intensive management mode requires more manpower and inability to invest,which brings higher demand for funds.And the support of financial services for agricultural management subjects is particularly important.However,the phenomenon of rural credit rationing is quite common in China.No matter whether it is small farmers or scale operators,all has to face the problems of financing difficulties.Many new agricultural management subjects are facing with serious financial constraints,and the support from the financial department is limited.Therefore,it is more necessary to further adjust and optimize the distribution of resources in the current rural financial market,strengthen the cooperation and interaction between the rural credit market and the insurance market,enhance the innovation of financial products,and improve the agricultural credit rationing.At the same time,the growth rate was 4.5%and 4.2%lower than that of the same period.In order to solve the problem of farmers' credit difficulties,the interactive mechanism of agricultural insurance and credit insurance,supply chain finance,forest right mortgage,chattel mortgage,anti guarantee mechanism and other innovative mechanism gradually appeared(Jiujie Ma,2008).As a form of the interaction between the bank and the bank,the loan guarantee insurance is designed to flow the funds to the rural financial market through the financial institutions,especially to help the new rural management subject,which has the demand for funds but lack the collateral,to alleviate the credit constraints.In 2009,the interaction mechanism for establishing the combination of rural credit and agricultural insurance in China was first explicitly proposed in Document No.1 of the Central Committee.In 2016,Document No.1 of the Central Committee further indicated that the linkage mechanism of agricultural subsidies,agricultural credit,agricultural futures and agricultural insurance should be accelerated.The publication of these series of documents shows that the combination of agricultural credit and agricultural insurance has been strongly supported in policy.Therefore,based on the existing background,this paper focuses on the theme of "the impact of loan guarantee insurance on the credit rationing of farmers",and tries to answer the following questions:can the loan guarantee insurance increase the supply of credit institutions in essence,reduce the loan conditions of farmers and then alleviate the credit rationing of farmers?How does the loan guarantee insurance alleviate the credit rationing received by the farmers?Is there any difference in the effect of loan guarantee insurance on different farmers' credit rationing?What is the effect of the model in recent years?Based on this series of problems,the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of loan guarantee insurance on the credit rationing of farmers from the empirical level,based on information asymmetry theory and insuranee theory,and to promote the interconnection between agricultural credit and agricultural insurance and to alleviate the ultimate improvement of farmers' credit constraints.Farmers' income provides theoretical basis and policy reference.The full text is divided into six chapters.The main research contents and conclusions include the following aspects.First,comb the development process and practice of loan guarantee insurance in China,and sum up the implementation of loan guarantee insurance in China.So from the present situation,the current China,s loan assurance insurance market is not high,the extent of the cooperation is not deep,the current credit industry is not developed,which hinders the function of the loan guarantee insurance.Second,from the perspective of supply and demand,this paper analyzes the causes of rural credit rationing in China.Then the loan guarantee insurance is included in the analysis framework to further demonstrate the effect of loan assurance insurance on the relief of adverse selection and moral hazard,so as to demonstrate the effect of the loan on the credit rationing produced by the farmers.From the two aspects of risk and transaction cost,this paper analyzes the credit rationing of farmers at present.On this basis,we analyze the collateral substitution effect of loan guarantee insurance,and demonstrate its impact on Farmers' self rationing.Fourth,we provide empirical evidence for the above theoretical analysis through the DID model.From the empirical results,the implementation of the loan guarantee insurance has a significant negative impact on the total quantity distribution of farmers.It relaxes the bank's demand for the farmers' collateral and reduces the lending threshold,thus alleviating the credit rationing of the farmers becatuse of the shortage of supply.However,it has no significant impact on Farmers' transaction costs and risk rationing,but also has no significant impact on Farmers' credit rationing due to insufficient demand.From the pilot situation in Jiangsu,the role played by the national legal policy on the interaction of silver insurance is not yet obvious.The loan guarantee insurance contract in the pilot project can alleviate the credit rationing of farmers to a certain extent,but the transaction is also faced with a greater risk of breach of contract,and it is difficult to play the expected role.