Research On The Supervision Ability Of Non-controlling Shareholders Participating In Corporate Governance

There are two types of agency problems in corporate governance.The first type is the conflict of interest between the shareholders and the management of the company caused by the separation of ownership and management The second is that the controlling shareholders use the privilege to infringe the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and then affect the enterprise value.The second kind of agency problem in corporate governance,that is,the encroachment of major shareholders on the interests of other shareholders,is very serious in our country.In order to solve this problem,China has introduced the Equity Balance System and the independent director system to try to fill the lack of investor protection in China's capital market.However,empirical research shows that there are several large shareholders of enterprises performance is not better than the majority shareholders of enterprises,that is,equity balance does not effectively improve the performance of the evidence.Similarly,the independent director system has its own inherent defects,such as the imperfect manager market in China,insufficient incentives for independent directors,the way of producing independent directors and the source of remuneration,etc.There are some deficiencies in the supervision of controlling shareholders and management,and the supervision of directors of non-controlling shareholders can effectively fill this gap.This paper analyzes the whole process of non-controlling shareholders' supervision by comparing the cases of ewushang group and Zhongbai Group Furthermore,the author draws a conclusion that the strategic investors who have a certain share proportion and professional knowledge have the strongest supervisory ability among the non-controlling Shareholders The measurement of supervision costs and benefits is an important condition for the implementation of Supervision;under the background of the rise of new media,the small and medium-sized shareholders' cost of connection and supervision is greatly reduced,and the supervision ability is strengthened.The combination of the two is conducive to achieving mutual benefit and win-win Results Non-controlling shareholders are more likely to cooperate with controlling shareholders when they share the same strategic goals,which is beneficial to the long-term development of the enterprise.