Analysis Of The Influence Of Ownership Structure On The Credit Behavior Of China's Commercial Banks

At present,China's economic reform has entered a stage of deep development,and economic development has entered a "new normal" period.The core content of economic work has been continuously promoted to optimize supply-side structural reform.As an important role in the financial system,commercial banks play an important role in the reform of China's economic supply side structure.The adjustment of credit channels of commercial banks can optimize the economic structure and achieve the desired economic structure.Credit behavior is the most important part of commercial banks' business operations,and usually reflects the business policies and business objectives of commercial banks.The commercial bank credit behaviors studied in this paper include the cyclical characteristics of credit behavior,the industry concentration of credit distribution and the customer concentration of credit issuance.The allocation of commercial bank credit resources is usually affected by the bank's own governance structure,and the commercial bank's shareholding structure is the most important part of its governance structure.Therefore,based on the commercial bank's shareholding structure,this paper analyzes its credit behavior of commercial banks influences.First of all,this paper summarizes the theoretical analysis and empirical research on the influence of commercial bank's equity structure,commercial bank credit behavior and commercial bank's equity structure on its credit behavior.Then,on the empirical side,this paper selects 16 commercial banks with A-share listings in China for more than five years(as of 2018)as research samples,including five large state-owned commercial banks such as ICBC,Agricultural Bank of China,Bank of Communications,Bank of China,Construction bank;eight joint-stock banks;three important city commercial banks that have undertaken local economic development and construction tasks.From 2003 to 2017 as the research cycle,the empirical relationship between the ownership structure of credit banks and credit behaviors in China was empirically tested.The conclusions are as follows: First,during the sample period,the credit behavior characteristics of commercial banks in China show a reverse cyclicality,and the increase in the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of commercial banks and the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders will significantly strengthen the reverse of credit behavior.Periodically,on the contrary,the increase in the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders will weaken the reversecyclicality of credit behavior.Second,the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders and the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders and the industrial concentration of commercial bank credits are positively changing.The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders and the industrial concentration of commercial bank credit are negatively changed.Third,the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders and the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders and commercial bank credit The customer concentration shows a positive change relationship,while the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder and the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders and the customer concentration of commercial bank credit are negatively changed.Finally,based on the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research results,this paper puts forward two countermeasures and suggestions: First,in improving the macro-regulatory regulation of commercial banks,the regulator should reasonably grasp the linkage between economic policies and regulatory policies.Differentiated regulatory policies for commercial banks with different shareholding structures;second,in optimizing the ownership structure of commercial banks,commercial banks should choose the shareholding structure of commercial banks that are relatively controlled by state-owned shareholders,and strengthen supervision over state-owned shareholders.Appropriately increase the proportion of foreign capital,and introduce social equity capital to achieve diversification of equity structure.