Ownership Structure,Credit Behavior And Business Performance Of Rural Commercial Banks

As the work of rural financial reform deepening,level of the rural financial service enhanced steadily,and the innovation of agricultural financial institutions have reached remarkable achievements.As the main body of rural financial market,RCBs(short for rural commercial banks)provided financial support for rural market and played an important role to alleviate the financing problems of SMEs in rural areas because of its wide coverage,branch number and the preferential agricultural policies.During recent years,in the promotion of the reform of property right system,RCBs not only has realized the transformation of commercial operation mode,has also made important contributions to the development of rural economy.In the process of RCBs' joint-stock reform,the problem of corporate governance has always been of concern,the establishment of a sound and effective corporate governance mechanism is the important content of the reform,and it is also related to sustainable development of RCBs in the future.Ownership structure is the core content of corporate governance structure,reasonable ownership structure can promote the performance of commercial banks and has a far-reaching impact on the commercial bank credit management behavior.Before the reform of property rights,rural credit cooperatives had serious agency problems and insider control.After years of reform propulsion,RCBs' company governance issues have been effectively ease,RCBs are trying hard forward the modern financial enterprise direction.Jiangsu province is China's first batch of reform pilot area of RCBs' property right reform,and the first successful restructuring RCB is in Jiangsu Province.There are 62 existing rural cooperative financial institutions currently in Jiangsu,and 59 of which has completed joint-stock restructuring,its reform progress always remain the forefront of our country.Based on this,this paper devoted to study the relationship between RCBs' ownership structure,credit behavior and operating performance on the basis of the corporate governance theory and property rights theory,and then a empirical analysis conducted through multiple regression model,hope to provide a reference for future restructuring of the RCBs.This paper is divided into five parts,the first part is the background and research significance,research content and research methods,possible innovations and deficiencies.The second part is the theoretical basis and literature review,the reform of rural credit cooperatives property related literature,and expounded the reform of property rights of commercial banks and shareholding structure combined with the property right theory and corporate governance related theory.The third part is RCBs' restructuring process and present situation analysis,this part expounded the data source,combed RCBs'restructuring process,and carried on the descriptive analysis through the survey data of 32 RCBs in Jiangsu province,the main conclusions include:(1)the sample RCBs'shareholding structure was relatively scattered,private institutional shareholders was quite high,part of the sample had government property,but there were no government controlling problem;(2)The samples' deposit and lending business kept fast growth and high efficiency utilization of assets;besides,agricultural loan proportion is very high,RCBs did big efforts to support agriculture;(3)The growth of RCBs7 earnings remained increasing,credit spreads income is the main source of profits,but their risk of bad loans is higher than the industry average.The fourth part is this article's core part,the empirical test of RCBs'ownership structure,the credit behavior and operating performance,using a set of single equation models,the main empirical conclusions include:(1)the relationship between RCBs' ownership concentration and business performance was in line with the "hollowed hypothesis",highly centralized equity structure is not conducive to RCBs' operating performance level,and the existence of large shareholders also has a negative impact;(2)RCBs' state-owned equity were against its management performance improvement;(3)the equity structure,especially the nature of the equity of RCBs had significant effect on the credit behavior,and credit behavior can also lead to different performance difference.The fifth part is the article main conclusions and policy suggestions based on the above theoretical and empirical analysis.Based on the results of the study,the article finally puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions:(1)establish an effective balanced equity structure;(2)perfect the RCBs' shareholders,establish diversified equity capital;(3)improve the corporate governance mechanism,deepen the reform of RCBs' property rights system;(4)strengthen the construction of RCBs' supervision mechanism and control business risk effectively.