Research On Venture Investment Strategy Under Staged Financing Situation

The high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry of venture investment behaviors determine that venture capitalists often face high risks in the investment process.In the process of venture capital investment,the success of the project depends on the joint efforts of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.However,information asymmetry determines that both have their own information advantages and disadvantages,which has led to the formation of bilateral moral hazard.Staged financing can alleviate the problem of bilateral moral hazard to some extent.This dissertation is based on relevant theories such as venture capital theory and the related research on the bilateral moral hazards between venture capitalists and venture firms.It analyzes the investment strategies of venture capitalists based on the staged financing characteristics of venture capital.The conclusions obtained in this paper are as follows:(1)Research on venture capitalist's investment strategies based on Bayesian Game.First,the venture capitalist's investment strategy is summarized into three situations:(1)Investment in the seed period only;(2)Investment in the growth period only;(3)Investment in the seed and growth period continuously.Then the game model of the venture capitalist and entrepreneur is established according to the situation of each strategy,and we proceed to solve the game by backward induction.It can be concluded that the equilibrium payoffs of venture capitalists and venture firms is a strictly increasing function of the value-added ability of their mutual cooperation,and a strictly decreasing function of the cost coefficient of their respective efforts;in the case of simulation,the success probability of the project in the seed period(or growth period)under continuous investment is higher than the success probability of the project in the seed period(or growth period)of the project under discontinuous investment.(2)Research on venture capitalist's investment strategies based on Ambiguous Game.Firstly,the ambiguous game between venture capitalists is elaborated,and the expected utility interval matrix of venture capitalists' ambiguous game is obtained.Then it is transformed into a ambiguous preference degree matrix of the venture capitalist's derived game based on ambiguity aversion.And the ambiguity preference degree matrix is finally solved to obtain the equilibrium outcome.The following conclusions are drawn: The ambiguity preference degree of venture capitalists is an increasing function of the focal mass value of the corresponding focal element;in the case of simulation,Venture capitalists choose to invest in seed and growth period continuously under the circumstances of ambiguity.This dissertation applies the idea of ambiguity aversion to the choice of strategy which has certain theoretical and progressive significance for investment decisions in venture capital.