A Case Study On The Pledge Of Shares Of Maoye Commercial Controlling Shareholders

With the development of capital market,equity pledge,as a kind of right pledge,occupies a certain position in China's capital market financing.The reason why it is more and more favored by the controlling shareholders of listed companies is that,on the one hand,the procedures related to equity pledge are relatively simple with fewer restrictions;on the other hand,it can broaden the financing channels of enterprises.Especially in recent years,the pledge of equity has been in the state of expansion and growth.More and more controlling shareholders of listed companies also begin to use equity pledge for financing.Compared with other shareholders,controlling shareholders have very different status in listed companies,so their equity pledge behavior has attracted much attention from the market.Even if the choice of equity pledge is made by the controlling shareholder himself,his behavior will still bring certain influence to the listed company.Both positive and negative effects may be caused by the pledge of the controlling shareholder's equity.However,once the company is confronted with the encroachment of controlling shareholders' interests,it will bring a lot of risks,which will further affect the company's stock price and business performance.This paper takes the listed company Maoye commerce as the research object,first elaborates the research background and significance of this topic,and sorts out the relevant literatures of domestic and foreign scholars from the perspectives of shareholders' equity pledge,the economic consequences of equity pledge,the agency problem under equity pledge,equity pledge and interest expropriation.Secondly,the institutional background and relevant theories involved in this paper are expounded and analyzed.Thirdly,the paper introduces the situation of the pledge of the controlling shareholders of Maoye commerce,analyzes the influence of the market on the stock price of Maoye commerce in the short period after the pledge of the controlling shareholders of Maoye commerce with the event research method,analyzes the profitability and solvency of Maoye commerce with the quantitative analysis method,and judges the financial risk of Maoye commerce with the z-value analysis method.In addition,this paper expounds the expropriation of equity pledge interest from the aspects of related party transactions,financial expenses,non-operational occupation of funds,etc.,and analyzes the elements that controlling shareholders want to expropriate interest.Based on the analysis of Maoye's business cases,this paper finds that the market value of listed companies and the encroachment of shareholders' interests will be affected by the frequent pledge of shares by controlling shareholders.The short-term and long-term market value of listed companies will be negatively affected by shareholders' equity pledge.And the controlling shareholder's interest encroachment is affected by the degree of separation of control right and cash flow right and the impawn of controlling shareholder's equity.In addition,the governance of small and medium-sized shareholders is difficult,and the inefficient internal governance of the board of directors and the board of supervisors and the imperfection of the equity pledge system under the ownership structure dominated by one single share are also the reasons for the encroachment of controlling shareholders' interests.Therefore,in order to prevent the aggravation of the encroachment of interests after the pledge of shares,we should not only protect the interests of minority shareholders,improve the company's internal governance structure,improve the internal control system,increase the transparency of information disclosure,but also improve the pledge of shares system and strengthen the external supervision mechanism.