Research On Synergetic Governance Of Accurate Poverty Alleviation Based On Evolutionary Game

Poverty is a universally recognized problem.In the ‘Precision Poverty Alleviation' concept officially put forward in November 2013,it emphasizes the use of precise identification,precise assistance,and precise management of governance to eliminate regional overall poverty,so as to achieve the goal of ‘caps' in the poverty-stricken counties in 2020.Under the current standards in China,poverty alleviation has achieved remarkable results and decisive development.However,starting from the practice of poverty alleviation,it is believed that there are still problems and problems in the current poverty alleviation process,especially the situation that the poor groups have insufficient driving force for endogenous poverty alleviation.Second,local governments play a key role in tackling poverty.On the one hand,it is necessary to improve the management and governance of the grassroots,on the other hand,it must also mobilize the driving force of endogenous poverty alleviation of the poor.In addition to local governments as poverty alleviation groups,there are poverty alleviation groups like social organizations in society.They are also involved in precision poverty alleviation and play an important role in the process of poverty alleviation.The social organizations studied in this paper belong to competitive for-profit organizations,so how to balance their own development with poverty alleviation work to get coordinated development is a question worth considering.This thesis focuses on the collaborative management of three subjects in precision poverty alleviation,and conducts research on the behaviors of all parties involved in poverty alleviation,namely local government,social organizations and poverty groups.Firstly,based on the idea of dynamic game,the expected equilibrium returns of the participants of the game are derived,and the theoretical analysis affects the key parameters of poverty alleviation cooperation among the participants.Secondly,based on the perspective of evolutionary game,the stable equilibrium strategy between the games is obtained,and the key parameters of the poverty alleviation cooperation of the participants in the game are used to simulate the MATLAB software.It aims to study the conflicts and contradictions between the poverty alleviation groups and the poor groups,and analyze the profit and loss situation of the players in the game to provide practical and feasible countermeasures.The specific research conclusions show that:The conclusion of the game analysis between the local government and the poor groups:(1)When the poor groups support poverty alleviation,the incentive incentives provided by local governments play a greater role in the cooperation between the two parties in the early stage of poverty alleviation.(2)Increasing the income of the poor groups after ‘getting out of poverty' can significantly increase the willingness of local governments and poor groups to cooperate.(3)Increasing the opportunity loss of poor groups will affect the evolution of the competition between the two sides.When the opportunity loss reaches the upper limit,the poor group will lead to a negative mentality,resulting in a weak development trend and a vicious circle.The game analysis between local governments,social organizations and poor groups concludes:(1)increase the game The support of the various parties will affect the evolution of the three parties.Giving excessive support will help the poor and poor groups to rely on support,rather than paying attention to the consequences of getting rid of poverty.(2)When the social organizations and the poor groups adopt the(non-participation,non-support)strategy,the negative returns will reduce the probability of the three parties' coordinated poverty alleviation.Within the effective range,this measure can play a binding role and promote the synergistic effect of benign poverty alleviation.If it exceeds a reasonable range of negative returns,the effect will be counterproductive.(3)When the social organizations and the poor groups adopt(participation and support),the benefits will be positively contributing to the process of poverty reduction.Whether poor groups choose to support poverty alleviation depends on the stimulus that can bring economic benefits after poverty alleviation.Through reasonable and effective methods,local governments can help poor groups and social organizations to develop into a good model of poverty alleviation.The main innovations of this research are as follows:(1)Research perspective innovation: Combining precision poverty alleviation with game theory,through a new perspective to study the conflicts of interest between the players in the process of accurate poverty alleviation,and analyze whether the stable equilibrium strategy in the game is Reach the Pareto optimal state.(2)Research method innovation: The traditional game theory has limitations on the assumptions.The evolutionary game theory adopted in this paper is an improved version of the traditional game theory.It only assumes that the participants of the game are bounded rational,and the requirements for information are also It is no longer as harsh as the perfect information assumption.The results were finally presented in the form of data simulation using MATLAB software.