Hometown Connectedness,state Ownership And Accounting Information Quality

Marx believes that the economic base determines the superstructure,and the superstructure counteracts the economic base.As an important part of the superstructure,culture not only reflects the customs,social customs,and ideas of each nation,but also reflects the comprehensive strength of a country.Forty years of reform and opening up,China's economy has developed rapidly,and the social characteristics such as the differential pattern,family ties,and circle relations formed by the stability and continuity of culture have not changed.The market economy is based on a familiar society that focuses on ethical relationships.Based on it.At present,a large number of literatures have examined the impact of relationship networks on the micro-enterprise level in terms of executive compensation,fund performance,corporate risk,corporate innovation,and debt financing.So,does the social relationship between executives affect the company's governance? This article intends to further explore this issue from the strong rural complex of the Chinese.The quality of accounting information,as an indicator of agency conflict and information asymmetry between investors and management,can reflect the level of corporate governance to a certain extent.By interpreting accounting information,shareholders and creditors can not only assess the potential value of investment opportunities beforehand,but also monitor the use of capital after the event.From the perspective of internal governance,this paper examines the influence of the relationship between the chairman and the CEO on the quality of accounting information,mainly based on the following considerations: First,the traditional Chinese society is an acquaintance society based on blood relationship and geographical relationship.Compared with the relationship between colleagues and alumni,the relationship between the fellows has the characteristics of historical universality and far-reaching influence.Second,the chairman and CEO act as the center of the power structure of the listed company,and the relationship between the two determines whether the company can operate well.The research in this paper helps to examine the impact of the partnership on corporate governance.Finally,unlike the board culture of the mature market countries,the “one-size-fits-all” ownership structure makes the chairman play an important role in the company's actual decision-making.Therefore,studying the issue of chairman and CEO from the background of China's system can deepen the understanding of corporate issues with Chinese characteristics,and thus improve the efficiency of corporate governance.This paper takes the A-share listed company from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample,manually collects the birth information of the chairman and CEO,and empirically tests the influence of the relationship between the chairman and the CEO on the quality of corporate accounting information.The study found that:(1)the hometown connectedness between the chairman and the CEO can significantly improve the quality of accounting information.(2)According to the state ownership,the sample is divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.It is found that the positive impact of the hometown connectedness between the chairman and the CEO on the accounting information governance is significant in private enterprises and not significant in state-owned enterprises.(3)Further,this paper finds that under the circumstances of the chairman's shareholding,the chairman's local position and the high level of marketization of the company's location,the supervisory efficiency of the chairman will be further improved,thereby improving the efficiency of corporate governance.In general,the contribution of this paper lies in: Firstly,based on the perspective of relational network theory,this paper enriches and supplements the research scope of social relations and accounting information quality among executives.Secondly,through the examination of the dual leadership structure of the chairman-CEO,this paper can avoid the endogenous problems of the board composition due to the unequal rights,so that the conclusion is relatively stable.Finally,the conclusion of this paper is a useful supplement to the theory of “culture and finance” and shows the role of informal institutions in corporate governance.