Research Of Corporate Governance Structure On The Accounting Information Quality

Many countries give more and more attention on how to establish effective corporate governance structure, enhance the quality of accounting information. Given China's current capital market is still in development stage, financial reporting fraud cases having frequently occurred, which resulted in heavily low quality of accounting information, thus, the dissertation select the topic from the perspective of corporate governance structure, discussing the problems to improve the quality of accounting information, which has practical significance.From the governance structure of listed companies and accounting information quality theory basis, the dissertation use empirical research methods on the corporate governance structure and quality of accounting information by regression analysis. As for the choice of analysis of indicators on the corporate governance structure, the dissertation choose the ownership structure, board of directors and the supervisory board features three aspects. As for the selection of quantitative indicators of quality of accounting information, the author takes the SFC published financial reports of listed companies as measured by fraud, taking into account the accounting information quality of the standard evaluation system has not been perfect now. The dissertation selected the commission's penalties on the companies of financial reporting fraud as a sample, using comparison, the difference test and logistic regression analysis of statistical methods. The result of regression is:the higher the proportion of state-owned shares, the more the proportion of outstanding shares, the quality of accounting information worse, and as the board of supervisors characteristics, only two jobs concurrently on the quality of accounting information is basically significant, others are not significant. So the defect of corporate governance structure to a certain extent led to the public accounting information quality problems.The innovation of this paper is confirmed by empirical analysis of the ownership concentration and quality of accounting information inverted U-type relationship, that with the increased ownership concentration, quality of accounting information firstly increased and then decreased. Thus, corporate ownership concentration needs to be controlled within a reasonable range, and optimizing equity structure, improving the construction of the board and the supervisory board to resolve the root causes of the problem of low quality of accounting information.