The Price And Service Competition Strategy Of OEM Supply Chain Dominated By Brand Owners

With the increasing popularity of the Internet,oneline shopping has become the mainstream shopping mode at present.It is also a difficult problem in supply chain decision-making that manufacturers open up direct marketing channels,resulting in confusion of two channels.In the face of manufacturers' behavior of opening up direct marketing channels,brand merchants often use various means to restrict manufacturers' private direct marketing channels.In addition,there are many competitive products in the supply chain.Based on these realistic backgrounds,this paper mainly explores the decision-making behaviors of manufacturers and brands in the various hypothetical scenarios mentioned above in the OEM supply chain dominated by brand owners.This paper also studies the influence of factors such as the acceptability of direct selling channels and the brand premium coefficient of brand channels on the decision-making of supply chain members.This paper considers an OEM supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a dominant brand company.Firstly,the article compares and analyzes the optimal decision-making behaviors of the supply chain parties under the single-brand channel and mixed dual-channel modes and the utility level under each decision-making mode.The results show that after opening up direct marketing channels,the profit level of the manufacturers increases because of the new channels.At this time,the market competition intensifies,which stimulates the brand companies to improve the service quality.Under certain conditions,brand merchants may attract new consumers by improving channel service level,thereby improving their overall profit level.Subsequently,aiming at the problem of fines imposed by brand manufacturers for opening up direct marketing channels,this paper designs two kinds of fines models and analyses the effect of the two kinds of fines.The first penalty model is that the brand company fines the manufacturer according to the sales volume of the direct marketing channel.The second penalty model is that the brand company fines the manufacturer according to the sales volume of the brand channel.The results show that brand companies can reduce the profits of manufacturers by reducing the market demand of direct marketing channels and transferring part of their profits to brand companies through two different forms of fines,thus restraining manufacturers from opening direct marketing channels.The different mechanisms of the two penalty modes lead to the different optimal decisions of the supply chain members.Finally,this paper considers the existence of competitive products in OEM supply chain,and sets up two kinds of competitive products: ordinary products and high-end products.This paper considers two scenarios: brand developers develop new products to compete with existing products;Manufacturers develop new products and form product competition and channel competition with brand owners.The behavior of brand owners to sell two kinds of competitive products(ordinary products and high-end products)in brand channels does expand the market scale of brand channels,and when the brand premium coefficient of brand channels is high enough,the behavior of brand owners to sell two kinds of competitive products at the same time in brand channels can bring profit growth to brand owners.The behavior of manufacturer in developing new products increases the sales volume of direct channel and reduces the market price.Moreover,when the brand premium of brand channel is high enough,brand merchants will benefit from the behavior of manufacturer in introducing new channels and products.