Research On The Impact Of Equity Incentives Of Listed Companies On Investment Efficiency

With the separation of the two powers,the problem of principal-agents between business owners and managers began to emerge.This kind of principal-agent problem may lead to inefficient investment.On the one hand,managers may invest in projects with negative net present value to increase the scale of investment and increase the private benefits of control,resulting in over-investment;on the other hand,managers may consider giving up their own private costs.For companies,the net present value of investment opportunities is a positive project,which leads to the phenomenon of under-investment.In order to solve the agency problem,equity incentives,as a means of motivating management to converge managers and owners,began to practice in different enterprises.After the implementation of equity incentives,the investment efficiency of enterprises has also changed.Although scholars have done a lot of research on the impact of equity incentives on investment efficiency,the conclusions are not the same due to sample selection and other reasons.Especially for the impact of equity incentives on investment efficiency and the impact of equity incentive intensity on investment efficiency,the academic community has not reached a unified conclusion.In order to explore the impact of equity incentives on corporate investment efficiency,this paper selects A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as research samples,and uses panel data analysis methods to draw the following conclusions:(1)Implementation of equity Incentives have an inhibitory effect on over-investment,and the implementation of equity incentives can alleviate the underinvestment of listed companies.(2)The higher the intensity of implementing equity incentives,the lower the level of over-investment.At the same time,the higher the intensity of equity incentives,the better the mitigation of insufficient investment.(3)Compared with restrictive stock incentives,the implementation of stock option incentives can better suppress over-investment.(4)Compared with restricted stocks,the implementation of stock option incentives cannot better alleviate the lack of investment.(5)Compared with non-state-owned listed companies,the implementation of equity incentives by state-owned listed companies has a stronger inhibitory effect on over-investment.(6)Compared with non-state-owned listed companies,the implementation of equity incentives by state-owned listed companies has a better effect on improving investment.This paper comprehensively combs the theoretical and empirical research results of equity incentive and investment efficiency,and enriches and expands relevant research,which provides reference for the formulation of equity incentive plan and the improvement of enterprise investment efficiency.