Institutional Investors' Shareholding,Property Rights And Non-Efficiency Investment

Although there have been many studies on corporate governance effectiveness of institutional investors,few studies have considered portfolio perspective.For the purpose of maximizing cost-benefit,institutional investors have a stronger incentive to supervise companies whose portfolios are more important.That is to say,institutional investors have different weights in supervising resource allocation to companies with different weights in their portfolios..Considering the particularity of state-owned enterprises,this phenomenon of “combination of strengths and weaknesses” may have differences in the performance of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.An empirical study based on the data of listed companies from 2013 to 2016 shows that for firms with high portfolio weights,institutional investors can reduce their non-efficiency investments.After further analysis,it is found that this effect is mainly reflected in the mitigation of investment insufficiency;For companies with low portfolio weights,institutional investors cannot reduce their non-efficient investments.The sample is divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the nature of property rights.It is found that for enterprises with high investment weight,the reduction effect of institutional investors on non-efficiency investment is only reflected in non-state-owned enterprises,and is only reflected in the mitigation of insufficient investment.For enterprises with low investment weight,whether in state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises,institutional investors cannot reduce non-efficiency investment.In this paper,two-stage least squares(2SLS)was used for endogenous test,and it was found that the conclusion of this paper is still robust.The innovation of this paper is to examine the influence of institutional investors on non-efficiency investment from the perspective of investment portfolio.The study shows that the institutional investors' investment portfolio influences the supervisory role of institutional investors.This conclusion enriches the research on corporate governance of institutional investors.In addition,the research conclusions of this paper also reveal us: First,institutional investors' stocks are good news for small and medium-sized investors and capital markets,indicating that institutional investors are willing to invest more supervision resources for the company.Therefore,the whole society should encourage institutional investors to concentrate their investment and increase the right of institutional investors to speak.Second,we should speed up the reform of the state-owned enterprise system,increase the openness of state-owned enterprises,and ensure that all types of investment entities can conduct more comprehensive and effective supervision of state-owned enterprises,so as to promote the development of state-owned enterprises.