Research On Closed-loop Supply Chain Competition In Remanufacturing Authorization Mode

Remanufacturing plays an important role in saving resources,reducing environmental pollution and increasing social and business benefits.It is an important way to recycle and reuse waste materials.In practice,the remanufacturing industry has attracted independent third-party remanufacturers(third parties)to enter.However,the remanufacturing process of many products does not destroy the physical form of the waste product.It only repairs,replaces or repairs the damaged parts of the product,so that the remanufactured product maintains the appearance and internal structure of the original product.Even the trademark logo of the original product should be retained in the sale.Third-party remanufacturing involves the original equipment manufacturer(OEM)product reputation,technology patents,consumer market preemption and other issues,third parties often require OEM authorization to recycle and remanufacture waste products.For OEMs,some focus on the manufacture of new products,do not participate in the remanufacturing of used products,and others develops the remanufacturing of used products on the basis of the original new product manufacturing business.Therefore,this paper studies the competition of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the authorization mode based on whether OEM participates in the waste remanufacturing business.First,when the OEM does not participate in the scrap remanufacturing business,and the third party needs to pay the license fee to the OEM in order to carry out recycling and remanufacturing,both parties compete in the new supply/re-products supply chain sales market and the reverse supply chain recycling market.The Cournot game model with the constraint of maximizing the profit of both parties is established,and the optimal strategy of the two enterprises is obtained through the KT condition.Finally,the influences of important parameters such as unit license fee on decision variables and optimal profit are analyzed by analytical methods and numerical examples.Secondly,when the OEM participates in the scrap remanufacturing business,the third party pays the license fee for recycling and remanufacturing,and both parties compete in the supply chain sales market of the remanufactured product and thereverse supply chain recycling market.Profit maximization is the Cournot game model with constraints on the target,and the optimal remanufactured production volume and waste product recycling price of the two enterprises are obtained by KT conditions.Finally,the influences of important parameters such as unit license fee on decision variables and optimal profit are analyzed by analytical methods and numerical examples.